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Self-Preservation?
I. Introduction
The combination of more than a decade of decreasing
assistance from the federal government and a sudden economic
downturn in the late 1980's has left many state governments
with profound budget crises.' These crises have forced half of
1. Michael deC. Hinds, Revenue Problems Endanger Budgets in Half the
States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1990, at Al (economic decline in 1989 creates large
budget deficits in many states, especially in the Northeast); Michael deC. Hinds,
States and Cities Fight Recession with New Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at A8
(rising expenses and falling revenues have forced states to increase taxes and fees,
recession and increased state fiscal responsibility for national programs are pri-
mary causes; highlighting 20 states which enacted total of $18 billion in new taxes
and fees); Michael deC. Hinds, U.S. Adds Programs with Little Review of Local
Burdens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1992, at Al, A14 (In article on expanding federally
mandated spending, "[tlhree-quarters of the states . . . report worsening fiscal
problems this year, and many governors... are saying the problems will linger or
worsen over several years even if the economy recovers quickly."); Gwen Ifell, Gov-
ernors Seek $10 Billion in Increased Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at B10 (gov-
ernors impose taxes and reduce expenditures to deal with worst financial
conditions since 1983; slow recovery for state governments predicted regardless of
speed of economic recovery); Racing Against New Budget Year, States Work to
Forge Pacts on Spending, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1991, at A10 (legislators in Califor-
nia, Ohio, Massachusetts, Illinois, North Carolina, Maine and Pennsylvania faced
with passing budgets that will require steep tax increases, substantial cuts in pub-
lic services or both); Martin Tolchin, Despite Billions in Tax Rises, States Slash
Services, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at A16 (twenty-nine states had to reduce 1991
spending by $7.5 billion after 1991 budgets were enacted); Martin Tolchin, States
Take Up New Burdens to Pay for "New Federalism," N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1990, at
Al (reductions in various federal aid programs to states and localities coupled with
increases in spending mandated by the federal government have severely re-
stricted the ability of states to deal with their own fiscal problems).
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the states to reduce their judicial budgets.2 At the same time,
the state judiciaries have been inundated with a flood of new
filings, primarily criminal cases resulting from the "war on
drugs."3 These competing pressures on state judiciaries have
resulted in a similar crisis in the civil courts, often effectively
denying litigants access to the courts.4
The state of the judiciary in New York is typical of the
trend nationwide. The workload of the courts in New York has
greatly increased in the 1980s, fueled primarily by an increase
in narcotics-related cases in the criminal and family courts. 5 By
1991, New York State's fiscal problems placed severe limits on
its ability to increase funding to aid the judiciary.6 Pleas by the
judiciary for adequate funds to deal with the courts' increasing
workload have gone unanswered.7
2. Bryan J. Holzberg, Recession Forces Civil Court Cutbacks, LITIG. NEWS,
Oct. 1992, at 8.
3. Id. A study of court filings by a special committee of the American Bar As-
sociation indicates that nearly 80% of all filings are either criminal or family law
matters, and these areas are the ones that have been most adversely affected by
the drug crisis. Id.
4. Id. Delays in obtaining civil trials exceeds four years in both Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania and Newark, New Jersey, and several states have temporarily sus-
pended the trying of civil actions. Id. The Vermont Supreme Court ordered civil
jury trials suspended in 1990 and rejected a constitutional challenge to that order.
Vermont Supreme Court Admin. Directive No. 17 v. Vermont Supreme Court, 579
A.2d 1036 (Vt. 1990); see also Joseph F. Sullivan, Years of Backlogs Snarl New
Jersey Civil Courts, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1991, at B2 (increase in criminal cases
caused by stricter narcotics laws has caused an increase in backlog of civil cases;
increase of 38% in cases pending from June 1988 to May 1991, including 35% in-
crease in cases pending more than one year; president of the Conference of State
Court Administrators says New Jersey is an example of the national trend).
5. CHIEF ADM'R OF THE COURTS, STATE OF NEW YORK, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE CHIEF ADM'R OF THE COURTS 3-4 (1991). This report noted signifi-
cant increases in the caseload of the system between 1985 and 1990. Id. Felony
filings in the supreme and county courts statewide increased from 51,000 to 80,000
between 1985 and 1990, a 55% increase. Id. at 3. Drug indictments in New York
City increased 249% in the same period. Id. The backlog of cases in the New York
City Criminal Court increased 256% from the end of 1980 to the end of 1989. Id.
Criminal caseloads in the city courts outside New York City have increased be-
tween 55% and 129% between 1985 and 1990. Id. The overall caseload of the fam-
ily court has increased 33% statewide and 57% in New York City between 1985
and 1990. Id. at 4. The family court caseload increase in New York City includes a
147% increase in child protective cases during the same period and a 650% in-
crease in neglect and abuse cases between 1980 and 1989. Id. at 3.
6. See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Gary Spencer, Cuomo Ignores Courts in State of the State Speech,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 9, 1992, at 1; Gary Spencer, Cuomo Vows to Veto Hike in Court
154
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After nearly a year of intense public debate with Governor
Cuomo over the state judiciary's funding, Sol Wachtler, then
Chief Judge of New York, took the controversial step of suing
the Governor and the leaders of the legislature.8 The subject of
the debate was severe staffing cutbacks which resulted in de-
creased access for civil litigants,9 and a "lag payroll" system for
court employees that both state and federal courts invali-
dated.'0 Chief Judge Wachtler alleged that the Governor and
Funds, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 4, 1991, at 1 (Governor Cuomo calls proposed increase in
judiciary funding "unconscionable"); Gary Spencer, New Cuts Sought from Budget,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 1, 1991, at 1 (Governor Cuomo calls possibility of additional court
funding "unrealistic").
Chief Judge Wachtler's complaint detailed the reductions in the judiciary's
budget between 1982 and 1992:
Fiscal Year Request Appropriation Reduction
1982-83 $490,829,101 $480,100,101 $10,729,000
1983-84 $574,322,858 $555,712,058 $18,601,800
1984-85 $652,596,117 $603,845,236 $48,750,881
1985-86 $670,947,137 $655,397,237 $15,549,900
1986-87 $728,447,280 $713,625,280 $14,822,000
1987-88 $790,886,410 $767,385,910 $23,500,500
1988-89 $827,422,194 $807,013,194 $20,409,000
1989-90 $876,548,464 $866,887,464 $ 9,661,000
1990-91 $959,629,453 $878,527,485 $81,101,968
1991-92 $949,454,702 $874,217,702 $75,237,000
Verified Complaint at 12, Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 6034191 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County filed Sept. 27, 1991).
8. Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany County fied Sept. 27,
1991).
9. Gary Spencer, Wachtler Details Drastic Court Cuts, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 6, 1991,
at 1. The budget passed by the legislature in July 1991 required the Chief Judge
to close 34 of the 115 supreme court civil trial parts in New York City and 3 of the
19 supreme court civil trial parts in Suffolk County. Id.
10. The "lag payroll" system was a device designed to reduce the expenditures
of the judiciary by delaying payment of nonjudicial employees' wages until some-
time after they had been earned. The state legislature imposed a two-week lag
payroll in 1990, Act of May 25, 1990, ch. 190, § 375, 1990 N.Y. Laws 507, 819-20
(Lawyers Coop.), and then imposed a one-week lag payroll in 1991. N.Y. STATE
FIN. LAW § 200(2-b) (McKinney Supp. 1993). The 1990 lag payroll statute was in-
validated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Association of Surrogates &
Supreme Court Reporters v. New York, 940 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. i991), certified ques-
tion answered in, 78 N.Y.2d. 143, 577 N.E.2d 10, 573 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1991), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 936 (1992). The 1991 lag payroll statute was invalidated by the
New York Court of Appeals in Association of Surrogates & Supreme Court Report-
ers v. State, 79 N.Y.2d 39, 588 N.E.2d 51, 580 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1992). See generally
Gary Spencer, Court of Appeals Voids Judiciary's Lag Payroll; More Layoffs Pre-
dicted, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 17, 1992, at 1. Chief Judge Wachtler did not participate in
either of the New York Court of Appeals decisions cited above. Association of Sur-
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leaders of the legislature unconstitutionally denied the state ju-
diciary the funds that it needed to operate as an equal branch of
government." After attempts to move the dispute into the fed-
eral courts, 12 the suit was settled through the negotiating ef-
forts of the legislative leadership. 13 The out-of-court settlement
of this lawsuit leaves unresolved the extent of the judiciary's
power in New York State to ensure that the Governor and the
legislature (together "the political branches") allocate adequate
funds for the necessary operations of the judiciary.
This unresolved issue has continuing relevance. Wachtler
V. Cuomo' 4 is unique among court funding suits.' 5 As a general
matter, local governments have had the responsibility, espe-
cially at the trial level, for financing judicial operations.' 6 In
fact, the Wachtler suit appears to be the first challenge of an
appropriation decision made by the political branches regarding
a statewide judicial system. 17 As the first such statewide case,
Wachtler v. Cuomo also involves the most significant financial
rogates, 79 N.Y.2d at 48, 588 N.E.2d at 55, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 157; Association of
Surrogates, 78 N.Y.2d at 157, 577 N.E.2d at 16, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
11. Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany County filed Sept. 27,
1991).
12. See infra notes 269-78 and accompanying text.
13. Gary Spencer, Wachtler, Cuomo Settle Funding Suit, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 17,
1992, at 1.
14. Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany County filed Sept. 27,
1991).
15. See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. While Wachtler v. Cuomo is
unique in its scope, see infra note 18 and accompanying text, it was not the only
lawsuit to challenge the Governor's actions in regard to the judiciary's 1991-92
budget. In Schulz v. State, 152 Misc. 2d 589, 578 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1991), three citizens sued seeking a declaration that the entire 1991-92
budget was void because of the Governor's failure to submit the judiciary's budget
request "without revision." Id. at 590, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 823. Initially, this claim
survived the State's motion to dismiss for lack of standing and lack ofjusticiability.
Id. at 590-93, 595, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 823-25, 826. However, the Third Department
dismissed the cause of action on the grounds of mootness. Schulz v. State, 187
A.D.2d 789, 789-90, 589 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (3d Dep't 1992).
16. See Note, The Court's Inherent Power to Compel Legislative Funding of
Judicial Functions, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1687, 1687 n.6 (1983) (noting that inherent
power cases typically involve city and/or county governments).
17. More accurately, Wachtler v. Cuomo is the first case in which the political
branches' lump-sum appropriation for the judicial system has been challenged.
See Goodheart v. Casey, 555 K2d 1210 (Pa. 1988) (court had inherent power to
order state retirement board to contribute to judges' pension plans at specified
levels to provide adequate compensation to judges); State ex rel. Bagley v. Blank-
enship, 246 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1978) (court could order legislative clerk to publish
[Vol. 14:153
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issues to date.'8 The failure of the appellate courts in New York
to address this issue continues to leave this question open for
dispute.' 9 New York State's chronic budget problems, and the
judiciary's continuing struggle to deal with its increasing
caseload mean that despite the settlement of the Chief Judge's
action, questions remain unanswered. Two questions are likely
to surface again: what constitutes an adequate level of funding
for the judiciary, and what branch has the authority to make
the final determination as to the adequacy of funding?20
This Casenote will analyze the controversies created by
Wachtler v. Cuomo and attempt to determine how those contro-
versies would be resolved in the judicial process. Part II of this
Casenote will first examine how other courts have developed
the theory of an inherent power of the judiciary to order ade-
quate funding for its operations. Part II will then examine two
modern cases, Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate,21 and Mor-
gan County Commission v. Powell,22 and their competing views
on the validity of the doctrine. The development of this doctrine
in New York will then be examined. Part II will then examine
the conditions under which the judiciary in New York will inter-
vene in the budget process. Finally, Part II will examine the
particulars of the state budget crisis of the late 1980s and the
events leading up to, and including, the Wachtler v. Cuomo ac-
tion. Part III will attempt to determine how a future case might
be decided in the event that that future case cannot be settled.
appropriations bill to conform to chief justice's submission after legislature had
impermissibly reduced some items in the budget).
18. Compare the $5 million sought by the court in Commonwealth ex rel. Car-
roll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971), with the $77 million sought in Wachtler v.
Cuomo. See Gary Spencer, Wachtler Sues for Full Budget Request, N.Y. L.J., Sept.
27, 1991, at 1.
19. See infra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
20. In an address to the New York State Bar Association's annual meeting,
the Chief Administrator of the state's courts, Matthew Crosson, clearly indicated
his belief that the courts' funding crisis would likely continue in the near future,
regardless of any financial recovery by the state. Matthew T. Crosson, Lawyers
Respond to Needs of Courts in Fiscal Crisis, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29, 1992, at 37.
21. 274 A.2d 193 (Pa.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
22. 293 So. 2d 830 (Ala. 1974).
1994]
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II. Background
A. The Inherent Judicial Budgetary Power Doctrine
1. Origins of the Doctrine
The doctrine of inherent judicial budgetary power is de-
rived from the separation of powers doctrine, which is founded
upon "the political maxim, that the legislative, executive and
judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct."23 The
belief that those departments must be absolutely separate re-
suited in objections to the proposed federal constitution in the
1780s and is still a part of most state constitutions.24 Madison
demonstrated that Montesquieu and the state constitutions did
not require absolute separation of the departments of govern-
ment.25 Rather, a separation of powers concept, which pre-
vented one department of government from exercising the
entire power of another department, was capable of protecting
the people from tyranny.26 Merely marking out absolute or ex-
clusive limits on the powers of the respective departments of
government had not kept the departments completely separate
in practice in the states, and an absolute separation' on paper
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 243 (James Madison) (Gary Willis ed., 1982).
24. Id. While the federal constitution does not address the concept of "sepa-
rateness," see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, & art. III, § 1, 40 of thp states have
adopted specific "separateness" provisions, such as Arizona's:
The powers of the government of the State of Arizona shall be divided into
three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judi-
cial; and, except as provided in this Constitution, such departments shall be
separate and distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the
powers properly belonging to either of the others.
ARiz. CONST. art. III; see also AlA. CONST. art. III, §§ 42, 43; ARx CONST. art. IV,§§ 1, 2; CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. III; CONN. CONST. art. II; FLA.
CONST. art. II, § 3; GA. CONsT. art. I, § II, 3; IDAHO CONST. art. II, § 1; ILL. CONST.
art. II, § 1; IND. CoNsT. art. III, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 1; KY. CONST. §§ 27, 28;
LA. CoNST. art. II, §§ 1, 2; ME. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2; MD. CoNsT. Declaration of
Rights art. 8; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30; MICH. CONST. art. III, § 2; MINN. CONST.
art. III, § 1; Miss. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2; Mo. CONST. art. II, § 2; MONT. CONST. art.
III, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. II, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 37;
N.J. CONsT. art. III, 1; N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6; OKLA.
CONST. art. IV, § 1; OR. CONST. art. III, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. V; S.C. CONST. art. I,§ 8; S.D. CONST. art. II; TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2; TEx. CONST. art. II, § 1; UTAH
CONST. art. V, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 5; VA. CONST. art. I, § 5, art. III, § 1; W. VA.
CONST. art. V, § 1; Wyo. CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
26. Id. The origins of the doctrine of separation of powers predate Montes-
quieu. Note, supra note 16, at 1689 n.12 (tracing the origins of the doctrine).
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did not necessarily mean that "encroachments which lead to a
tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the
same hands" would not occur.27 The genius in the separation of
powers doctrine was not the absolute separateness, but that
there was "great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, giving those who ad-
minister each department, the necessary constitutional means,
to resist encroachments of the others."28
In defending the proposed federal constitution's judiciary
article, Hamilton noted that "[t]he complete independence of
the courts ... is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution."29
Judicial review of legislative enactments for constitutional in-
firmities allows the judiciary to act as "an intermediate body
between the people and the legislature, . . ., to keep the latter
within the limits assigned to their authority."30 In upholding
the constitution by annulling laws contrary to it, the judiciary
protects the people from legislative encroachments. 3'
In exercising its inherent budgetary powers, a court merely
engages in the judicial review of a legislative enactment that
the separation of powers doctrine requires. An appropriations
law, after all, is only a law, passed by a legislature purporting to
be acting within its constitutional powers. 32 An appropriations
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 249 (James Madison) (Gary Willis ed., 1982);
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 254 (James Madison) (Gary Willis ed., 1982); see also
Note, supra note 16, at 1689 n.13.
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Gary Willis ed., 1982).
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Willis ed.,
1982). The dependence of the colonial judiciary on the Crown was one of the griev-
ances raised by the Continental Congress. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Willis ed.,
1982).
31. Id. at 396-97.
32. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power...
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States.. . ."). Cases involving the refusal of an officer of the executive
department to pay bills incurred by the courts can be analyzed in the same way.
The acts of the executive branch must conform to the applicable constitution as the
acts of the legislature do. See City of New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U.S. 261 (1893);
Smith v. Meese, 821 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Carrasco, 786
F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1986); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), affd, 472
U.S. 846 (1985); Daniel v. Citizens & S. Natl Bank, 185 S.E. 696 (Ga. 1936); Cooke
v. Iverson, 122 N.W. 251 (Minn. 1909); Hearon v. Calus, 183 S.E. 13 (S.C. 1935);
Ekern v. McGovern, 142 N.W. 595 (Wis. 1913). If an act of the executive branch is
1994] 159
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law may offend a constitution in two ways. It may disturb the
separation of powers by usurping the judicial power either
through controlling the disposition or nondisposition of cases, or
by undermining the independence of the judiciary.33 On the
other hand, the appropriations law may deny people access to
the courts to seek redress for their injuries. 34 In either case, the
contradictory to the constitution, the act must be voided to keep the executive
within the limits of its authority. See Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S.
497 (1904); Smith v. Meese, 821 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Car-
rasco, 786 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1986); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984),
afl'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); San Christina Inv. Co. v. San Francisco, 141 P. 384 (Cal.
1914); State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 133 N.W. 857 (Minn. 1911); State ex rel.
Boone v. Metts, 88 So. 525 (Miss. 1921); Hobbs Gas Co. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv.
Comm., 858 P.2d 54, 56 (N.M. 1993) (holding that court has authority to declare
executive acts unlawful); In re Legislative Adjournment, 27 A. 324 (R.I. 1893);
Hearon v. Calus, 183 S.E. 13 (S.C. 1935); State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 137
N.W. 20 (Wis. 1912); see also In re McKnight, 550 N.E.2d 856, 859 (Mass. 1990)
(holding that court has authority to order executive department to perform statu-
torily required act); In re Lorie C., 49 N.Y.2d 161, 171, 400 N.E.2d 336, 341, 424
N.Y.S.2d 395, 401 (1980) ("[Clourts do not normally have overview of the lawful
acts of [executive] officials involving questions of judgment, discretion, allocation
of resources and priorities.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted); In re Dale P.,
189 A.D.2d 325, 335, 595 N.Y.S.2d 970, 977 (2d Dep't 1993) (holding lawful acts of
executive not subject to judicial review). The judiciary thus acts to protect the
people against encroachments by the executive branch, as well as the legislature.
33. Note, supra note 16, at 1690-91 & nn.16-20.
34. Most states guarantee a right of access to the courts for civil actions in
their constitutions, in provisions such as Alabama's: "That all courts shall be open;
and that every person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, or person, or
reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall
be administered without sale, denial, or delay." ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; see also
Aim CONST. art. II, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 21; GA. CONST. art. I, § I, 12; IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 18; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. Bill of
Rights § 18; Ky. CONST. § 14; LA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ME. CONST. art. I, § 19; MD.
CONST. Declaration of Rights art. 19; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 11; MINN. CONST. art.
I, § 8; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14; MONT. CONST. art. II,
§ 16; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.H. CoNsT. pt. I, art. 14; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18;
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; OIA. CONST. art. II, § 6; OR.
CONST. art. I, § 10; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 9; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13;
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. ch. I, § 4; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10; W. VA.
CONST. art. Ill, § 17; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9; WYO. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
In a number of states this right has been established by court decision. See,
e.g., State v. McCracken, 520 P.2d 787 (Alaska 1973) (holding that denial of access
to the civil courts violates due process); Payne v. Superior Court, 553 P.2d 565
(Cal. 1976) (holding that due process rights protected by the California Constitu-
tion embraces a right of access to the courts); Rodriguez v. Grand Trunk Western
R.R., 328 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (access to courts is a fundamental
160
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inherent budgetary power question presents a potential conflict
between a law and a constitution. As Chief Justice Marshall
explained in Marbury v. Madison,35 if there is a conflict between
a law and the constitution, a court is constrained by its "duty
[as part] of the judicial department to say what the law is," and
must resolve the conflict between the law and the constitution
by voiding the law and applying the constitution.36 Despite the
continuous debate over the legitimacy of judicial review,37 the
doctrine has been broadly accepted in the state courts. 3
8
right); Moore v. Fragatos, 321 N.W.2d 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (same); Charles v.
Fischer Baking Co., 187 A. 175 (N.J. 1935). However, in New York there is no per
se constitutional right to access to the civil courts. Colton v. Riccobono, 67 N.Y.2d
571, 576, 496 N.E.2d 670, 673, 505 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584 (1986) ("As a general rule,
access to the courts in and of itself is not a right protected by the Constitution.");
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State, 146 A.D.2d 212, 540 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d Dep't
1989), affd, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 550 N.E.2d 919, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1990).
35. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
36. Id. at 177; see also THE FEDERAuST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
37. The literature on the legitimacy of judicial review is so voluminous that
any listing can only be representative at best.
Classic statements viewing judicial review as undemocratic and as under-
cutting popular responsibility are Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," 7 Harv.L.Rev. 129 (1893), and
Commager, Majority Rule and Minority Rights (1943). Important defenses
of judicial intervention are Rostow, "The Democratic Character of Judicial
Review," 66 Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1952), and C.L. Black, Jr., The People and the
Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy (1960).
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 19 (12th ed. 1991). For recent articles on
the subject, see Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for
Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 975 (1993); Richard Delgado, Comments on
Mary Becker, 64 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1051 (1993); Caroline S. Earle, The American
Judicial Review Quagmire: A Canadian Proposal, 68 IND. L.J. 1357 (1993); David
E. Engdahl, John Marshall's 'Jeffersonian' Concept of Judicial Review, 42 DUKE
L.J. 279 (1992); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judi-
cial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309 (1993); Barry
Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577 (1993); Wallace
Mendelson, The Judiciary Act of 1789: The Formal Origin of Federal Judicial Re-
view, 76 JUDICATURE 133 (1992); Ron Replogle, The Scope of Representation-Rein-
forcing Judicial Review, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1592 (1992); Symposium, One Hundred
Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1
(1993).
38. See, e.g., Dyer v. Tuskaloosa Bridge Co., 2 Port. 296, 303 (Ala. 1835); Wick-
ersham v. Smith, 7 Alaska 522, 537 (1927); People ex rel. State v. Childs, 257 P.
366, 367 (Ariz. 1927); Williams v. State, 108 S.W. 838, 840 (Ark. 1908); Attorney
General v. Burbank, 12 Cal. 378, 384 (1859); People ex rel. Tucker v. Rucker, 5
Colo. 455, 458 (1880); Trustees of the Bishop's Fund v. Rider, 13 Conn. 87, 92
(1839) (citing prior Connecticut cases); Bailey v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R., 4 Del.
(4 Harr.) 389, 402-03 (1846); Cotten v. County Comm'rs, 6 Fla. 610, 613-16 (1856);
9
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Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 204-05 (1848); State ex rel.
Amemiya v. Anderson, 545 P.2d 1175, 1181 (Haw. 1976); Gillesby v. Board of
Comm'rs, 107 P. 71, 73 (Idaho 1910); Lane v. Doe ex rel. Dorman, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.)
238, 240 (1841); Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342, 344 (1853); Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene
15, 20-21 (Iowa 1849); Mayberry v. Kelley, 1 Kan. 116, 125 (1862); Bliss v. Com-
monwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 93-94 (1822); Syndics of Brooks v. Weyman, 3 Mart.
9, 12 (La. 1813); Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Me. 112, 114 (1829); Whittington v.
Polk, 1 H. & J. 236, 242-45 (Md. 1802); Mueller v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 30
N.E.2d 217, 221 (Mass. 1940); Carolene Products Co. v. Thomson, 267 N.W. 608,
610 (Mich. 1936); Minnesota St. Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624,
633 n.5 (Minn. 1976); Reed v. Bjornson, 253 N.W. 102, 104 (Minn. 1934); Runnels
v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 146, 147 (1823); Baily v. Gentry, 1 Mo. 164, 165-66
(1822); State ex rel. Toomey v. State Bd. of Examiners, 238 P. 316, 319-20 (Mont.
1925); State ex rel. Stall v. Bartley, 59 N.W. 907, 907, 909 (Neb. 1894); State ex rel.
Perry v. Arrington, 4 P. 735, 737 (Nev. 1884); State v. Ramseyer, 58 A. 958, 960
(N.H. 1904); State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1802), affd, 9 N.J.L.
434 note; Torres v. Board of Comm'rs, 65 P. 181, 182 (N.M. 1901); Bayard v. Sin-
gleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 42, 45 (1787); State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, 156 N.W. 561,
563-64 (N.D. 1916); Cincinnati, W. & Z. R.R. v. Commissioners of Clinton County,
1 Ohio St. 77, 81 (1852); State ex rel. Cruce v. Cease, 114 P. 251, 252 (Okla. 1911);
King v. City of Portland, 2 Or. 146, 152 (1865); Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 419,
422-23 (Pa. 1808); Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493, 501 (Pa. 1799); In re Legis-
lative Adjournment, 27 A. 324, 327 (R.I. 1893); Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 S.C.L.
(2 Bay) 38, 61-62 (S.C. 1796); Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Basford, 139 N.W.
795, 798-99 (S.D. 1913); Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor of Memphis, 44 Tenn. 419,
430 (1867); Williams v. Taylor, 19 S.W. 156, 156 (Tex. 1892); Block v. Schwartz, 76
P. 22, 23 (Utah 1904); Beecham v. Leahy, 287 A.2d 836, 841 (Vt. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 20 (1782); State ex rel. Case v. Howell, 147 P.
1162, 1164 (Wash. 1915); Harmison v. Ballot Comm'rs, 31 S.E. 394, 395 (W. Va.
1898); Bonnett v. Vallier, 116 N.W. 885, 887, 888 (Wis. 1908); In re Board of
Comm'rs, 32 P. 850, 851 (Wyo. 1893).
In New York as well, this doctrine has been one of long standing. Professor
Corwin traces judicial review of statutes in New York all the way back to 1783, and
the first invalidation to 1821. Edward S. Corwin, The Extension of Judicial Review
in New York: 1783-1905, 15 MicH. L. REv. 281, 282, 286. n.11 (1917). However,
"judicial review" in this context is a misnomer for two reasons. The first is that
under the Constitution of 1777, statutes were submitted to a Council of Revision,
consisting of the Governor, the Chancellor and the two justices of the supreme
court, which effectively eliminated the need for judicial review. N.Y. CONST. of
1777 art. III; 1 CHARLEs Z. LINCoLN, THE CONsTrrtmoNAL HISTORY OF NEw YoRK
743-79 (1906); 2.id. at 145.
The second reason is that between 1777 and 1846, New York's highest court
was in fact dominated by the State Senate. In the state constitutions of 1777 and
1821, the highest court of the state was the Court for the Trial of Impeachments
and the Correction of Errors, which was comprised of the state senators, the chan-
cellor and the judges of the supreme court. N.Y. CONST. of 1777 art. XXXJI; N.Y.
CONST. of 1821 art. V, § 1. However, the Chancellor could not vote in appeals from
equity and the judges, or justices as they were called in the constitution of 1821,
could not vote in appeals in law. N.Y. CONST. of 1777 art. XXXII; N.Y. CONST. of
1821 art. V, § 1. With the number of senators at 32 after 1801, N.Y. CONST. of 1777
amend. III (1801), the decision of the senators inevitably carried the day in each
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The trend of American jurisprudence for the past 120 years
has been to recognize that the judiciary, as an independent
branch of government, retains an inherent power to compel the
expenditure of public funds for the judiciary's necessary func-
tions.39 One of the first expressions of this power was in In re
Janitor of Supreme Court,40 in which the Wisconsin Supreme
Court ordered the reinstatement of that court's janitor4' after
the janitor had been dismissed by another state official. In con-
cluding that it alone had the power to appoint and remove its
janitor, the court stated:
It is a power inherent in every court of record, and especially
courts of last resort, to appoint such assistants; and the court it-
self is to judge of the necessity. This principle is well settled and
familiar, and the power so essential to the expedition and proper
conducting of judicial business, that it may be looked upon as very
doubtful whether the court can be deprived of it.42
2. Classification of Inherent Judicial Budgetary Power
Cases
Cases involving inherent judicial budgetary powers can be
broadly classified into two categories: "expenditure cases" and
"appropriations cases." In expenditure cases, the court orders
the acquisition of goods or services for its use, and then orders
the appropriating body43 to pay for it. In the appropriations
cases, the court challenges the appropriating body's decisions
case. See FRANcis BERGAN, THE HIsTORY OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS,
1847-1932, at 12-14 (1985). While the convention of 1846, which created the Court
of Appeals, cited the failure of the Court of Errors to declare a statute unconstitu-
tional as a reason for creating the Court of Appeals, both Lincoln and Corwin con-
clusively dispute that assertion. 2 LINcoLN, supra, at 145-46;- Corwin, supra, at
283, 285.
39. Note, supra note 16, at 1688 n.8 (noting wide acceptance of doctrine in
American courts); see also Ted Z. Robertson & Christa Brown, The Judiciary's In-
herent Power to Compel Funding: A Tale of Heating Stoves and Air Conditioners,
20 ST. MARY's L.J. 863, 868-78 (1989).
40. 35 Wis. 410 (1874).
41. Id. at 421. The janitor at this time performed minor clerical tasks for the
justices in addition to his custodial duties. Robertson & Brown, supra note 39, at
870.
42. In re Janitor, 35 Wis. at 419.
43. "Appropriating body" is used in this article to refer to the legislative or
quasi-legislative body that is responsible for providing the court in question with
its operating funds.
1994]
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regarding the level of court funding before those decisions are
put into effect.
State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis,44 is a classic example of an
expenditure case. The Supreme Court of Nevada requested
that the board of capitol commissioners purchase chairs and
carpet for the court's offices. 45 The board refused to approve
such a purchase, and in response, the court ordered the court's
bailiff to purchase the items.46 The bailiff purchased the items
from Kitzmeyer.47 Kitzmeyer presented his bill to the state,
which the auditors approved, but the state controller refused to
pay.48 Kitzmeyer sought a writ of mandamus 49 against the
controller.50
The court granted the writ, holding that the court had an
inherent power "growing out of and necessary to the exercise of
its constitutional jurisdiction"51 to order the purchases. To vest
total control of the court's facilities to the capitol commissioners
would grant the legislature, which created the board, the power
to destroy the entire judiciary.52
An example of an appropriations case is Judges for Third
Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne. 53 The judges of the Third
Judicial Circuit, which included Wayne County, brought an ac-
tion against the county, the board of supervisors and the county
treasurer to compel them to provide funds for additional proba-
tion officers, law clerks and a judicial assistant.54 The circuit
44. 68 P. 689 (Nev. 1902).
45. Id. at 690. The board was charged with controlling the expenditure of
funds appropriated by the legislature for the maintenance of the state capitol
building. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent ju-
risdiction, in the name of the state..., directed to some inferior court, tribu-
nal or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of
a particular duty..., which duty results from the official station of the party
to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.
52 Am. Ju.R 2D Mandamus § 1 (1970) (footnotes omitted); see also 55 C.J.S. Man-
damus § 1 (1948).
50. Kitzmeyer, 68 P. at 690.
51. Id. at 691.
52. Id.
53. 190 N.W.2d 228 (Mich.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1971).
54. Id. at 229 (Brennan, J., separate opinion).
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court granted the relief and issued a writ of mandamus order-
ing the defendants to provide the necessary funds for certain
positions and for the judges' legal expenses in bringing suit.55
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court.56 The
Michigan Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part,57 and then granted a petition for rehearing.58
On rehearing, the Court adopted the separate opinion of
Justices Black and Dethmers 59 from the first Supreme Court
decision.60 The Supreme Court in Michigan has the responsibil-
ity of ensuring that the "one court of justice" prescribed by the
Michigan Constitution6' functions as a coequal branch of gov-
ernment. The needs of the circuit court, never denied by the
county, were adequately proven, and the ability of the county to
make those payments was not a limitation on the court's right
to order them.62 The court then adopted the constitutional ne-
cessity argument of Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate:63
[t]he Judiciary must possess the inherent power to determine and
compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and
necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities, and its pow-
ers and duties to administer Justice, if it is to be in reality a co-
equal, independent Branch of our Government. This principle
55. Id.
56. Judges for Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 167 N.W.2d 337
(Mich. App. 1969).
57. Judges for Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 172 N.W.2d 436
(Mich. 1969). It appears that the original decision was 5-2 for affirming the court
of appeals, but once the court's opinion for the majority was completed, one justice
switched his vote and dissented, and one justice joined the majority reluctantly to
preserve the judgment, preferring the decision to be grounded on inherent power,
rather than statutory, grounds. See id. at 448 (Black, J., separate, supplemental
opinion).
58. County of Wayne, 190 N.W.2d at 229 (Brennan, J., separate opinion).
59. County of Wayne, 172 N.W.2d at 445-48 (Black, J., affirming in part).
60. County of Wayne, 190 N.W.2d at 241-42 (Per curiam, on rehearing).
61. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 1.
The judicial power of this state is vested exclusively in one court of justice
which shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial
court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court,
and courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish.
Id.
62. County of Wayne, 172 N.W.2d at 446 (Black, J., affirming in part).
63. 274 A.2d 193 (Pa.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
1994] 165
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has long been recognized, not only in this Commonwealth but also
throughout our Nation.64
Courts in twenty-nine states, besides New York, have ac-
knowledged their inherent power to compel appropriating bod-
ies to spend funds for the court's purposes.6 5 The dividing line
between courts does not lie in finding the existence of the
power, but rather between those that exercise the power by
compelling payment or appropriation of funds,66 and those that
64. County of Wayne, 190 N.W.2d at 241 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Car-
roll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971)).
65. See cases cited infra notes 66-67 (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin).
66. Millholen v. Riley, 293 P. 69 (Cal. 1930) (holding that the judiciary had the
power to displace impediments to its efficient operation subject to reasonable re-
strictions that do not materially interfere with constitutional functions, thus the
court could fix the salary of a law secretary and order it paid from public funds);
Rappaport v. Payne, 35 P.2d 183 (Cal. App. 1934) (applying principle of Millholen,
trial court could order county to pay salary of temporary court reporter); Hart
Bros. Co. v. Los Angeles County, 82 P.2d 221 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1938)
(stating that the inherent power to promote the efficient operation of the courts
supported the order to pay expenses of lodging, meals, and transportation of jurors
kept together during criminal trial); Smith v. Miller, 384 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1963)
(stating that the court had inherent power to compel the board of county commis-
sioners to pay judicial employees at salaries set by the court); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Curry, 545 So. 2d 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the trial
court had inherent power to order the county to pay appointed counsel in excess of
statutory maximum); Grimsley v. Twiggs County, 292 S.E.2d 675 (Ga. 1982) (stat-
ing that the court had inherent power to order the county to pay for temporary
clerical assistance as a necessary operating expense, and the power to compel ap-
propriations not limited by state statute); People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 219
N.E.2d 337 (Ill. 1966) (stating that the court had inherent power to compel state
officials to pay the fees and expenses of attorneys defending prisoners charged
with murder of prison guards); McAfee v. State ex rel. Stodola, 284 N.E.2d 778
(Ind. 1972) (stating that the court had an inherent power to order the county to pay
the salaries of judicial employees at amounts set by judges as part of the power to
compel expenditures necessary for the proper functioning of the court); Carlson v.
State ex rel. Stodola, 220 N.E.2d 532 (Ind. 1966) (stating that the city court had
inherent power to order the city council to provide the funds necessary to operate
the court); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 29 N.E.2d 405 (Ind.
1940) (stating that the court had an inherent power to order the county to pay
counsel appointed by the court to defend indigents charged with murder; and ap-
pointment of counsel in such cases was constitutional power, refusal to pay for
counsel amounted to impairment of constitutional powers); Jefferson County ex rel.
Grauman v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 192 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. 1946) (stating
that the inherent power of court to make appointments implied an inherent power
166
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to compel appropriations for the compensation of appointees); City Court v. Town
of Breaux Bridge, 440 So. 2d 1374 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that the court had
an inherent power to order the city to pay reasonable expenses of the court's opera-
tions, including miscellaneous expenses such as postage, etc.), cert. denied, 444 So.
2d 1219 (La. 1984); O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester County, 287 N.E.2d
608 (Mass. 1972) (stating that the court has an inherent power to order any ex-
pense reasonably necessary to operate the court and therefore the court could or-
der the county to pay for a tape recorder and tapes purchased by the court to
substitute for absent court reporter); Judges for Third Judicial Circuit v. County of
Wayne, 190 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. 1971) (stating that the court had the power to order
the county to provide the funds for immediate appointment and compensation of
additional judicial employees), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972); State ex rel. Doug-
las v. Westfall, 89 N.W. 175 (Minn. 1902) (stating that the court has the power to
appoint all necessary employees essential to conducting the court's business);
State ex rel. Anderson v. St. Louis County, 421 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1967) (stating that
the juvenile court had the power to hire employees, at the county's expense, that
were reasonably necessary to carry out its functions); State ex rel. Schneider v.
Cunningham, 101 P. 962 (Mont. 1909) (stating that the court has the inherent
power to appoint necessary assistants, determine their compensation, and order
the payment of compensation at public expense); Azbarea v. North Las Vegas, 590
P.2d 161 (Nev. 1979) (stating that the court had the inherent power to order the
city to pay the overtime claims of judicial personnel where the reasonableness of
the overtime and claims for it were not contested); State ex rel. Marshall v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 396 P.2d 680 (Nev. 1964) (stating that the court had the in-
herent power to order the county to supply counsel appointed for retrial with the
transcript of the first trial at county expense); State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 68
P. 689 (Nev. 1902) (stating that the judiciary possessed the power to prevent con-
trol of its functions by another branch of government and therefore could order the
state treasurer to pay for courtroom furnishings ordered by the court); State v.
Horton, 170 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1961) (stating that the court's constitutional obligation to
provide counsel to indigents in murder cases meant that it had an inherent power
to order the payment of all expenses necessary for a proper defense, in addition to
attorney's fees); Mowrer v. Rusk, 618 P.2d 886 (N.M. 1980) (stating that the consti-
tutional court has an inherent right to preserve its independent existence); Smith
v. Smith, 114 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952) (stating that the court had an inher-
ent power to do what was necessary to perform its functions, and, therefore, the
court could order the payment of expenses incurred in statutorily-mandated inves-
tigations in matrimonial actions); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d
193 (Pa.) (stating that the judiciary has an inherent power to order the city govern-
ment to provide funds which are reasonably necessary for a court to perform its
mandated responsibilities), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); Edwards v.
Prutzman, 165 A. 255 (Pa. 1933) (stating that the court has the power to engage a
handwriting expert in an election fraud case and compel the county officials to pay
the expert's bill as part of the court's inherent power to order expenditures neces-
sary for the proper administration of justice); Scott v. Minehaha County, 152 N.W.
699 (S.D. 1915) (stating that the court had an inherent power to order the county
to pay for the publication of court calendars as a necessary carrying on of its public
business); Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971)
(stating that the court had an inherent power to appoint probation personnel and
fix their salaries when such personnel were necessary for the court administra-
tion); Dane County v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585 (1861) (stating that the court had the
15
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acknowledge that they possess the power but do not compel the
payment of specific expenses or appropriation for specific pur-
poses.67 This distinction is based on the deciding court's deter-
power to order the county to pay attorneys for defending indigent criminal defend-
ants irrespective of a contrary statute, as a necessary consequence of the power to
appoint counsel).
67. Lockwood v. Board of Supervisors, 297 P.2d 356 (Ariz. 1956) (stating that
the inherent power of the court authorized it to mandate spending in excess of the
amount budgeted for it by the county, but where the court had not shown that the
county budget had prevented operation of the court, the exercise of inherent power
was not warranted); State v. Superior Court, 409 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966)
(stating that the court's inherent power did not authorize compelling payment of
disbursements of appointed counsel since such expenses were not necessary for the
court's existence and operation); Venhaus v. State ex rel. Lofton, 684 S.W.2d 252
(Ark. 1985) (stating that the court could not compel the county to pay probation
officer's salaries, determined by the court, in the absence of substantial evidence
that the officers were essential to the court); Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953
(Colo. 1984) (stating that the trial court could not exercise an inherent power to
compel county expenditures to render facilities adequate for the court's needs,
where judicial administrative rules vested such authority in the state supreme
court and its designees, because the trial court judge was not a designee of the
supreme court); Schmelzel v. Board of Comm'rs, 100 P. 106 (Idaho 1909) (stating
that the expenses for shaving and cutting of jurors' hair were not necessary to
administer justice); Webster County Bd. of Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d
869 (Iowa 1978) (stating that the inherent power to employ assistants and compel
their compensation did not entitle the court to compel continued employment of a
criminal investigator where there was no showing that such investigator was nec-
essary to the court's functions); Commissioners of Neosho County v. Stoddart, 13
Kan. 207 (1874) (stating that the court's inherent power did not extend to the
purchase of courtroom carpeting); Greene v. Ballard, 192 S.W. 841 (Ky. 1917) (stat-
ing that the court's inherent power could not be extended to compel the state to
pay the cost of bringing indigent's witnesses to the murder trial; such power was
not necessary in light of the court's ability to compel attendance without compen-
sation); Twenty-First Judicial Dist. Court v. State ex rel. Gusto, 563 So. 2d 1185
(La. App.) (stating that while the court had an inherent power to compel the appro-
priation of funds necessary for its operations, the power could not be exercised to
compel the state to fund operation of the court where adequate funds were avail-
able to eliminate the court's operating deficit), cert. denied, 568 So. 2d 1082, and
cert. denied, 568 So. 2d 1088 (La. 1990); State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 137 P. 392
(Mont. 1913) (stating that the exercise of the inherent power of courts was limited
to situations where the court is deprived of the assistance necessary for the exer-
cise of its duties or other emergencies, and therefore, the court could not order the
county to pay personally-appointed assistant's salary where the county had pro-
vided adequate personnel); Shaw v. Holt County, 129 N.W. 552 (Neb. 1911) (stat-
ing that the expenses of a special bailiff who was appointed by the court, acting
outside its authority, were not necessary and the county was not liable for them);
Board of County Comm'rs v. Devine, 294 P.2d 366 (Nev. 1956) (stating that the
inherent power to compel authorities to pay the salary of an attendant appointed
by the court could only be exercised where the efficient administration of justice
was impaired or in emergencies; here there was no showing that the assignment of
168
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/4
1994] WACHTLER v. CUOMO 169
mination of how "necessary" the proposed expenditure is to the
court's functions.
B. Divergent Modern Analyses of the Inherent Power Problem
1. Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate
The leading modern case on inherent power, Common-
wealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate,68 finds that the inherent power is
based on the judiciary's "right and power to protect itself
against any impairment" of "its functions and duties."69
Carroll arose from a dispute between the judges of the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia and the Mayor and city
council of Philadelphia. 70 When the city council refused to ap-
an inadequate number of bailiffs to the court impaired its functions, and therefore,
the county did not have to pay the salary of the court appointed bailiff); State v.
Weeks, 101 A. 35 (N.H. 1917) (stating that the court could not compel the county to
pay the fees of indigent murder defendant's experts where statutes only authorized
payment of attorney's and witness' fees); State ex rel. Finley v. Pfeiffer, 126 N.E.2d
57 (Ohio 1955) (stating that the judiciary possesses all powers necessary for unim-
peded exercise of its functions; however, the court here failed to show the reason-
able necessity of facilities that it had ordered built at public expense); Committee
for Marion County Bar Ass'n v. County of Marion, 123 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio 1954)
(stating that the court has an inherent power to compel expenditures for providing
facilities and improvements necessary to perform its governmental functions, but
that power did not include the power to compel the installation of an elevator in
the courthouse); Leahey v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1949) (recognizing that the
court has an inherent power to fix salaries of court employees and compel their
payment, but denying relief where the court failed to follow statutory procedures
for fixing salaries before invoking inherent powers); In re Salary of Juvenile Direc-
tor, 552 P.2d 163 (Wash. 1976) (stating that the court could not exercise an inher-
ent power to increase the salary for a probation officer, set by the county according
to statute, in the absence of evidence that the salary was so inadequate as to pre-
vent the court from fulfilling its responsibilities or that the increase was reason-
ably necessary for the administration of justice); Stevenson v. Milwaukee County,
121 N.W. 654 (Wis. 1909) (stating that the court had an inherent power to appoint
court personnel, but where a statute fixed the manner in which compensation of
such personnel was to be determined, the court could not compel the county to pay
attendants based on compensation fixed by the court).
68. 274 A.2d 193 (Pa.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
69. Id. at 197.
70. Id. at 194. In December 1969, the court of common pleas of Philadelphia
submitted a $19.7 million budget request to the Finance Director of the City of
Philadelphia for the operations of that court and the municipal court for the 1970-
71 fiscal year. Id. at 194-95. The finance director recommended a budget of $16.5
million, which was adopted in the Mayor's budget, which was then submitted to
the city council. Id. at 195. Several judges of the court of common pleas and mem-
bers of their administrative staffs appeared before the city council regarding their
original budget request and requested an additional $5.2 million for the upcoming
17
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propriate additional funds for the operation of the court of com-
mon pleas, Carroll, the President Judge7' of the court, sued
various city executive officials and the city council seeking the
funds that the city council refused to appropriate. 72 The defend-
ants raised the defense that the appropriation approved by the
city council, if properly utilized, was sufficient to provide for all
of the operations of the court of common pleas and the munici-
pal court, including those for which funds were sought in the
action.73 The trial judge74 rejected this defense and ruled that
the court of common pleas had met its burden of proof to demon-
strate the "reasonable necessity" of its request and ordered the
defendants to pay nearly $2.5 million.7 5 Both sides appealed to
fiscal year, including $2 million that was not in their previous request. Id. The
city council then approved the amount in the Mayor's budget. Id.
71. The president judge is "administrative head" of the court of common pleas,
responsible for supervision of the court's business. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(d),
Sched. art. V, § 16(f), superseded by 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 325 (1981).
72. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 195.
73. Id.
74. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court designated a judge of the Superior
Court to decide the case. Id. That judge heard arguments from the parties on
several different occasions. Id.
75. Id. at 195-96. The trial court's apportionment of the amount awarded to
the court of common pleas, as compared to the amounts sought in Carroll's com-
plaint was as follows:
Original Amended Court Order
Request Request 9/30/70
Adult Probation $1,782,216 $1,071,937 $800,000
Juvenile Probation 539,922 345,032 250,000
Data Processing 453,934 434,175 250,000
Apprehension of Fugitives 335,910 284,322 285,000
Courtroom Personnel 224,452 152,420 100,000
Attorney Fees 300,000 300,000 300,000
Arbitration Fees 390,000 390,000 200,000
Writ Service 100,000 100,000 75,000
Gibson Building Personnel 227,036 113,518 Disallowed
Probation Relocation 24,500 24,500 Disallowed
Repairs - 1801 Vine Street 40,000 40,000 Disallowed
Janitorial Staff 56,940 47,431 Disallowed
Microfilm 96,822 88,335 Disallowed
Bail Project 172,857 145,881 Disallowed
Dental Equipment 10,413 10,413 Disallowed
Domestic Relations 61,912 51,593 Disallowed
Total Copy System 23,000 23,000 23,000
Building Services 145,377 129,449 Disallowed
Law Clerks 133,206 133,206 100,000
Station Wagon 2,320 2,320 Disallowed
Prothonotary Relocation 35,000 Withdrawn
Crime Commission Grant 75,000 75,000 75,000
Totals $5,230,817 $3,962,532 $2,458,000
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the commonwealth court, and while that appeal was pending,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted a petition for plenary
review. 76 _
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first analyzed the rela-
tionship of the three branches and found that the judiciary was
"independent and co-equal" with the other two branches.77 The
independent nature of the judiciary required that it have
"rights and powers co-equal with its functions and duties, in-
cluding the right and power to protect itself against any impair-
ment thereof."7 8 That power to protect meant that "the
Judiciary [possessed] the inherent power to determine and com-
pel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and
necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities, and its
powers and duties to administer Justice . . .79
The trial judge applied the correct standard in the case,
which was that the judiciary is entitled to the funds that are
"reasonably necessary" to provide "for the efficient administra-
tion of justice."80 To fail to provide such funds would impair the
administration of the justice system and erode the confidence
and trust of the public in the judiciary.81 The judiciary's need
for funding cannot be balanced against the ability of the legisla-
ture to provide funds because to do so would ignore the clear
"[c]onstitutional mandate that the Judiciary shall be free and
independent and able to provide an efficient and effective sys-
tem of Justice."82 To fail to grant the judiciary the power to
compel reasonably necessary funding for its operations place it,
and the commonwealth's tripartite form of government, at the
whim of the legislature.83 The trial court correctly concluded
that the funds allocated by the city were inadequate for the rea-
sonable needs of the court of common pleas for the 1970 fiscal
Id. at 196. "Amended request" refers to the court of common pleas' reduction in the
amount sought in the complaint when the record was closed. Id. at 195-96.
76. Id. at 196.
77. Id. at 196-97.
78. Id. at 197.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 199 (quoting Leahey v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577, 580 (Pa. 1949)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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year and correctly determined the amount needed to correct the
inadequacy.8
Three justices concurred, 85 but one stated that the standard
of proof must take the fiscal condition of government into con-
sideration.86 The concurrence contended that the majority opin-
ion essentially bestowed on the judiciary a superior power
regarding its fiscal affairs by granting to it the power to compel
"reasonably necessary" funds.8 7 This supremacy was funda-
mentally at odds with the asserted constitutional basis of the
judiciary's power, which was the coequal nature of the branches
of government.88 The concurrence conceded that the executive
branch was capable of dealing with disputes such as the one in
this case in the political arena, but found the "mercurial world
of politics" unsatisfactory as a court for redress, especially as
the sole method of redress. 89
Logical consistency, in the concurrence's view, required the
granting of a similar power to the executive branch.90 But
granting the agencies of the executive branch the same power to
compel the "reasonably necessary" funding of their operations
created the possibility in which an appropriating body could not
raise sufficient funds to meet the expenditures it was compelled
to appropriate.9 1 Any standard, therefore, which failed to take
the financial situation of the city into account was not
appropriate.92
2. Morgan County Commission v. Powell
While the Carroll case follows the majority rule in finding
that an inherent power to compel funding of judicial operations,
84. Id. at 199-200. The judgment was modified to reflect that only four
months of the fiscal year were left at the time the decision was handed down. Id.
at 200.
85. Id. at 203-04 (Jones, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 204 (Jones, J., concurring). The fact that funds sufficient to satisfy
any potential judgment had been set aside pending resolution of the action so that
Philadelphia would not face "involuntary bankruptcy" was determinative of Jus-
tice Jones' decision to concur. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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that view is not unanimous. Despite the wide acceptance of the
doctrine by the courts,93 the doctrine was rejected by the Ala-
bama Supreme Court in Morgan County Commission v.
Powell.94
The Morgan County case was the result of a dispute be-
tween the judges of the Circuit Court for Morgan County and
the Morgan County Commission (the "Commission") over the
power to set the salaries of the judges' secretaries. 95 When the
Commission refused to approve the salaries fixed by the judges,
the judges ordered the Commission to pay their secretaries in
accordance with the schedule they had approved.96
In reversing the judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court
applied a restrictive view of what functions were part of the ju-
dicial function and its inherent power.97 The court first noted
that the state government was divided into three branches, leg-
islative, executive and judicial. 98 "Within their respective
93. See supra notes 39, 65-67 and accompanying text.
94. 293 So. 2d 830 (Ala. 1974).
95. Id. at 831-34. A state statute allowed the judges of the Eighth Judicial
Circuit, which included Morgan County, "to employ such clerical or stenographic
assistance as may be necessary to carry out the duties of his office." Id. at 831-32.
The salary of these employees was to be set by the judge, with the approval of the
county governing board. Id. The Commission requested a tentative budget for the
court in 1971. Id. at 832. The judges submitted the budget with varying amounts
for secretarial salaries for each judge, based on the seniority of the judge. Id. The
Commission informed the court that the pay scale reflected in the proposed budget
would not be followed and instead the secretaries would be paid pursuant to a
State Personnel Board classification. Id.
The pay scale submitted by the judges for 1973 was also rejected by the Com-
mission. Id. at 832-33. When a judge's secretary resigned in March 1973, the
court held a convocation of the judges to conduct a wage survey to determine what
a reasonable salary for secretaries would be. Id. The wage survey was conducted,
and the judges made a detailed finding of fact as to what a reasonable salary was
based on the survey, fixed the salaries of the secretaries and sent the matter to the
Commission. Id. The Commission rejected the findings and refused to alter the
salaries. Id.
96. Id. at 833. The court issued an show cause order to the commissioners
why the proposed salary schedule should not be implemented as reasonable. Id.
The commissioners filed a motion to recuse, which was denied, and then answered,
essentially defending on the basis that the salaries paid to the court's secretaries
were reasonable in light of the county's other financial responsibilities. Id. The
court then determined that its salary schedule for its secretaries was reasonable
and ordered the Commission to pay the secretaries the amounts specified by the
court. Id.
97. Id. at 834-38.
98. Id. at 834 (citing ALA. CONST. § 42).
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spheres each branch of government is supreme[ I" and is im-
mune from encroachment by another branch.99 The Alabama
Constitution and prior decisions of the court had made clear
that the power to determine what the appropriate level of fund-
ing was for the necessary functions of the government was ex-
clusively a legislative function.100 The power of the judiciary to
preserve its independence is limited to the protection of the op-
eration of the adjudicatory process and the payment of small
sums, incurred in an emergency, essential for the operation of
the court.10 1 That power was not designed to completely insu-
late the judiciary from political control. 10 2
The separation of powers provision in the Alabama Consti-
tution and the delegation of the "power of the purse" to the leg-
islative branch merely reflected the people's view that the
legislature was better equipped to take into consideration the
fiscal needs of government as a whole. Additionally, the legisla-
ture is better equipped to make decisions regarding the appor-
tionment of a fund that is inevitably too small to meet the
demands placed on it, whereas the judiciary "have neither the
time nor the equipment for making such decisions." 03 The
court also noted its holding in an earlier case, Jefferson County
v. Capanes,'°4 that regardless of any inherent judicial budget-
ary powers that had been expressed in other jurisdictions, the
courts of Alabama had no power to alter the compensation of a
public employee without statutory authority. 0 5 This led the
court to conclude that the fundamental problem with the inher-
ent power doctrine as adopted by Carroll was that:
[i]f the courts have inherent power to determine their fiscal needs
and to order the same paid, then surely this same power should be
99. Id. (citing Ex parte Huguley Water Sys., 213 So. 2d 799 (Ala. 1968) and
State ex rel. French v. Stone, 139 So. 328 (Ala. 1932)).
100. Id. (citing ALA. CONST. § 72 and Abramson v. Hard, 155 So. 590 (Ala.
1934)).
101. Id. at 835.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 179 So. 637 (Ala. 1938).
105. Morgan County, 293 So. 2d at 836-37. The Jefferson County case in-
volved the payment of the cost of meals served to a bailiff who was "attending
jurors ordered to be kept together." Id. at 836. Since there was no allowance for
the payment for such meals by statute, the court could not order the county to pay
the bill. Id. at 837.
174 [Vol. 14:153
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/4
WACHTLER v. CUOMO
accorded to the executive branch even though this branch pos-
sesses no machinery of its own to order such payments. In their
wisdom the people have given to the legislative branch the power
and authority to appropriate public monies. Without the centrali-
zation of this power in one branch, and if each branch of govern-
ment be considered fiscally independent, though the judicial and
executive branches are without power to tax and raise money,
then it can be said with certitude that fiscal chaos would follow as
day follows night.106
Chief Justice (and now United States Senator) Heflin dis-
sented. 107 While the Chief Justice felt that the trial court could
be sustained on statutory grounds or on the failure of the Com-
mission to properly respond to the order to show cause, 08 the
majority's rejection of any inherent judicial budgetary power in
support of its decision required him to state the basis for the
existence of such a power in Alabama. 1°9 The dissent distin-
guished the Jefferson County case on the basis that the real is-
sue was not inherent judicial power, but rather whether a court
could grant a judgment to a plaintiff in assumpsit,"10 where the
basis for the action was the incurring of expenses by a public
officer without statutory authority."' Save Jefferson County,
which Chief Justice Heflin distinguished, there was no case in
Alabama dealing with an inherent judicial budgetary power.
Further, all of the prior Alabama cases addressing inherent ju-
dicial powers had upheld the existence of the inherent power in
question."12
106. Id. at 837.
107. Id. at 841-56 (Heflin, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 846. The Chief Justice interpreted the statute in question to mean
that the judges set the salaries for their secretaries and the Commission was
bound to approve the judges' determination unless the Commission could demon-
strate the "unreasonableness" of the determination. Id. at 841-44. In any event,
the failure of the Commission to introduce any evidence in response to the show
cause order that the court's determination was unreasonable under the circum-
stances created a presumption that the determination was reasonable. Id. at 844-
45 (citing American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Long, 207 So. 2d 129 (Ala. 1968) and
McWilliams v. Phillips, 71 Ala. 80 (1881)).
109. Id. at 846-53.
110. "A common law form of action which lies for the recovery of damages for
the performance of a parol or simple contract." BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 122 (6th
ed. 1990).
111. Morgan County, 293 So. 2d at 846-47 (Heflin, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 847 (citing Exparte Huguley Water Sys., 213 So. 2d 799 (Ala. 1968)
(power to strike parties irrespective of statute on third party practice); Broadway
1994] 175
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The dissent then noted the majority's acknowledgment of
the existence of an inherent power' 13 and declared:
Once the power is recognized, the issue is no longer its existence,
but its bounds. The fact that no case has arisen in which it be-
came necessary for the courts to exercise their dormant power to
accomplish things not of a strictly judicial nature is no indication
that the power is limited to those acts which are strictly
judicial.114
The dissent reviewed the state of the law on inherent judicial
budgetary powers in the nation and found that "every court...
which has considered the issue has upheld the power of the ju-
dicial branch to provide for itself when the real needs of justice
have been slighted by a legislative branch pre-occupied with
other, more visible problems." 115 The dissent noted that there
were significant restraints on the judiciary's use of that power:
direct accountability to the voters, the right of the people to fur-
ther amend the state constitution and the judiciary's adherence
to a standard of reasonableness and self-restraint in dealing
with such matters. 116
The majority's final arguments, the necessity for an equal
power in the executive branch and the "fiscal chaos" argument,
were summarily disposed of. 117 The dissent noted that the
"thrust of the development of Anglo-American constitutional
law has been to limit the power of the executive branch and to
secure the independence of the judiciary."" s This thrust was
responsible for the lack of inherent executive powers and lim-
v. State, 60 So. 2d 701 (Ala. 1952) (power to grant new trial); Exparte Wetzel, 8 So.
2d 824 (Ala. 1942) (power to punish contempt); Brown v. McKnight, 114 So. 40
(Ala. 1927) (rulemaking); Ex parte State, 43 So. 490 (Ala. 1907) (power to stay
executions); Ex parte Mayor, 33 So. 13 (Ala. 1902) (rulemaking and contempt); and
Larkin v. Mason, 71 Ala. 227 (1881) (power to prevent abuse of process)).
113. See supra text accompanying note 101.
114. Morgan County, 293 So. 2d at 847 (Heflin, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 847-48 (citing cases).
116. Id. at 849-50 ("It is therefore incumbent upon members of the judicial
department to proceed cautiously, and with due considerations for the prerogatives
of the executive department and the Legislature whenever exercise of an inherent
judicial power would bring us near the sphere of another department.") (quoting
O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester County, 287 N.E.2d 608, 615 (Mass.
1972)).
117. Id. at 851-53.
118. Id. at 851 (citing THE MAGNA CARTA; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE; U.S. CONsTuTION; and the ALA. CONsTrrUION).
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ited the power of the executive to that explicitly granted by the
constitution. 119 The "fiscal chaos" argument was rejected on the
ground that the amount spent on Alabama's judicial system was
minuscule in terms of overall state government spending. 120 In
view of the overwhelming sister-state authority in favor of an
inherent judicial budgetary power and the lack of any persua-
sive Alabama authority against it, the dissent found such a
power to exist.121
C. The Inherent Budgetary Power in the New York Courts
The history of the inherent power doctrine in New York has
been marked by three stages: 1) theoretical acceptance coupled
with a reluctance to apply the doctrine in specific cases; 2)
amendment of the New York Constitution to sharply limit the
doctrine; and 3) revival of the doctrine by lower courts by plac-
ing limitations on the otherwise explicit constitutional
language.
1. Theoretical Acceptance /Practical Rejection
a. The Cole Cases
In People ex rel. Cole v. Hill,2 2 and People ex rel. Cole v.
Board of Supervisors,123 New York courts were first faced with
the inherent judicial budgetary power question. Cole, a news-
paper publisher, sought a peremptory mandamus 124 from the
supreme court ordering Hill, the treasurer of Greene County, to
119. Id. at 852 (quoting Charles S. Hyneman, Bureaucracy and the Demo-
cratic System, 6 LA. L. REv. 309, 315, 330 (1945)).
120. Id. at 853 (noting that proportion of appropriations for state judicial sys-
tem at 1/2% of all appropriations).
121. Id.
122. 43 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 619 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1885).
123. 46 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 299 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1886).
124. A peremptory writ of mandamus is a writ of enforcement "requiring that
the act or acts which are sought to be enforced, and which the relator has shown
himself entitled to, be done absolutely," and "constitutes both a judgment and an
execution." 52 AM. JuR. 2D Mandamus § 475 (1970); see also 55 C.J.S. Mandamus
§ 343 (1948). Under New York's Code of Civil Procedure, a peremptory writ of
mandamus was available "in the first instance, where the applicant's right to the
mandamus depend[ed] only upon questions of law." Code of Civil Procedure
§ 2070, Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 448, [1876] 2 N.Y. Laws 1, as amended by Act of
May 6, 1880, ch. 178, [1880] 2 N.Y. Laws 1, 193, repealed by Act of May 22, 1937,
ch. 526, 1937 N.Y. Laws 1186; see also N.Y. JuR. 2D Article 78 and Related Proceed-
ings § 1 (1980).
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pay the cost of publishing court calendars. 125 The supreme
court, sitting in special term in Greene County, issued the man-
damus. 126 The general term of the supreme court reversed,
holding that because the Code of Civil Procedure already pro-
vided for the publication of court calendars, the original order
was a usurpation of legislative authority and was not supported
by any inherent power of the judiciary.127 Cole then sought pay-
ment of the bill from the county's board of supervisors. 28 After
the board refused to pay the bill, Cole sought a peremptory
mandamus from the supreme court against the board. 129 The
general term affirmed a denial of the mandamus, acknowledg-
ing "an inherent power of the court, when in session, to incur
such expense as may judicially be determined to be neces-
sary."130 In order to preserve that power, however, it must "ex-
clud[e] from its scope whatever does not strictly fall within
it."131 Since the legislature had made some provision for the
publication of court calendars, the courts here did not have the
power to order publication beyond what was provided for in the
statute.132
125. Hill, 43 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 619. Ajustice of the supreme court sitting in the
special term in Greene County issued an order requiring the publication of the
schedule of the terms of various courts in a local newspaper, the Windham Jour-
nal. Id. The county treasurer was ordered to the publisher upon proof of publica-
tion out of monies raised for "court expenses." Id. Cole, the publisher, published
the schedules and sought payment. Id. Hill, the county treasurer, refused. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 620 (citing Code of Civil Procedure § 3317, Act of June 2, 1876, ch.
448, [1876] 2 N.Y. Laws 1, as amended by Act of May 6, 1880, ch. 178, [1880] 2 N.Y.
Laws 1, 670, repealed by Act of May 22, 1937, ch. 526, 1937 N.Y. Laws 1186). The
New York Constitution of 1846 provided for the division of the supreme court into
four general terms statewide, as organized by the legislature, as well as for special
terms, circuit courts, and courts of oyer and terminer in each county. N.Y. CONST.
of 1846, art. VI, § 6, amended by, art. VI, § 7 (repealed 1938). The special term was
responsible for the trial of equitable actions and for hearing motions, petitions and
special proceedings. 28 N.Y. Jun. 2D Courts and Judges § 3 (1983). The general
term heard appeals from special term, the circuit courts and the Courts of Oyer
and Terminer. Id.
128. Id.
129. Board of Supervisors, 46 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 299.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 300.
132. Id. at 299-300 (citing Code of Civil Procedure §§ 225, 226, 232, 233, Act of
June 2, 1876, ch. 448, [1876] 2 N.Y. Laws 1, repealed by Act of May 22, 1937, ch.
526, 1937 N.Y. Laws 1186).
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b. Moynahan v. City of New York 133
The New York Court of Appeals in Moynahan reversed in
part a judgment for a stenographer in his action for fees for pro-
ducing transcripts during a trial.'3 The court acknowledged
that "[tihe general rule is that the higher courts have such in-
herent powers as are necessary to the proper discharge of their
duties and the exercise of their jurisdiction."135 The transcript
provided to the trial judge served a necessary purpose, assisting
him in ruling on evidence correctly, so that the further public
expense that a retrial would entail could be avoided.13 6 There
was no statutory limitation on the power regarding supplying
transcripts to trial judges. 137 The trial judge, therefore, pos-
sessed the inherent power to order the transcript for himself at
public expense and it was not important that the copy for the
judge had been ordered by the district attorney, since the judge
was the intended recipient of the transcript. 38 That inherent
power did not, however, include the power to order the public
payment of a defense copy of the transcript because such ex-
penditures were limited, in time and manner, by statute.139
133. 205 N.Y. 181, 98 N.E. 482 (1912)
134. Id. at 183, 98 N.E. at 483. During the course of a trial for first degree
murder, Moynahan delivered several daily copies of the trial transcript: two for the
district attorney, one of which went to the trial judge, one for the Governor, and
one for defense counsel. Id. Defense counsel's copy was provided on the order of
the trial judge, who ordered that it be provided at public expense. Id.
Moynahan sued the city for the cost of the transcripts. The City admitted lia-
bility for the cost of the district attorney's and the Governor's copies. After plain-
tiffs case at trial, the plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict was granted and the
defendant's motion for a nonsuit was denied. Id. The city appealed and the appel-
late division affirmed. Moynahan v. City of New York, 140 A.D. 911, 125 N.Y.S.
1132 (1st Dep't 1910).
135. Moynahan, 205 N.Y. at 188, 98 N.E. at 485 (citation omitted).
136. Id., 98 N.E. at 484-85.
137. Id., 98 N.E. at 485.
138. Id. at 187-88, 98 N.E. at 484-85.
139. Id. at 192, 98 N.E. at 486 (citing Code of Criminal Procedure § 456, Act of
June 1, 1881, ch. 442, [1881] 2 N.Y. Laws 1, as amended by Act of May 14, 1897, ch.
427, § 1, [1897] 1 N.Y. Laws 569, 570, repealed by Act of May 20, 1970, ch. 996, § 4,
1970 N.Y. Laws 3117, 3372 (providing for transcript to be given to defendant's
counsel for purposes of appeal at public expense)). The city was willing to admit
liability for the defendant's counsel's transcript if Moynahan waived further pay-
ment under section 456, but Moynahan refused. Id. at 184, 98 N.E. at 483.
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A brief dissent140 held that the inherent powers of the judi-
ciary were limited to those powers which always existed, or
which grew out of some preexisting power.141 Court stenogra-
phy did not fit either category, therefore any remedy to Moyna-
han must be statutory.142
c. In Re Kenney 43
Kenney was assigned to defend an indigent charged with
first degree murder.'" After the trial, Kenney submitted an af-
fidavit of his expenses incurred in the defense. 45 Included in
those expenses were fees for a translator's services before the
trial and charges for daily transcripts of the trial supplied to
Kenney, which the trial judge ordered supplied to him at public
expense.46 The City Comptroller failed to pay any of the ex-
penses set forth in the affidavit. 147 Kenney obtained an order to
show cause for a peremptory mandamus to compel payment. 48
On the return date, the writ was issued, ordering the Comptrol-
ler to make payment. 49 The Comptroller appealed. 150 On ap-
peal, the only charges contested were for the transcripts and the
translator.151 The appellate division reversed the trial court's
order.52 Moynahan answered the transcript charges ques-
tion. 53 Additionally, there was no evidence in the record that
the services of the translator before trial were "necessary and
proper," therefore, they could not be charged to the public. 54
140. Id. at 193-94, 98 N.E. at 486-87 (Bartlett, J., dissenting). Chief Judge
Cullen joined in this dissent.
141. Id. at 193, 98 N.E. at 486.
142. Id. at 193-94, 98 N.E. at 486-87.
143. 153 A.D. 325, 137 N.Y.S. 1097 (2d Dep't 1912).
144. Id. at 325, 137 N.Y.S. at 1097-98.
145. Id. at 325-26, 137 N.Y.S. at 1098.
146. Id. at 326, 137 N.Y.S. at 1098.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 327, 137 N.Y.S. at 1099.
153. Id.; see supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
154. Kenney, 153 A.D. at 326, 137 N.Y.S. at 1098.
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d. In re Sullivan' 55
In Sullivan, the district attorney of Queens County brought
an action to transfer a patient from one mental institution to
another, as the patient had become a threat to the safety of her-
self and others in the first institution.156 The court appointed
an attorney to act as counsel for the patient.157 The court noted
that the Mental Hygiene Law provided for payment for the ren-
dering of two types of services in such a proceeding: service as a
commissioner, and service as a medical witness. 58
In moving to confirm the commissioner's recommendation
that the patient be moved, the district attorney requested that
the court fix fees and expenses. 59 The supreme court entered
an order providing for fees for the attorney. 60 The Appellate
Division, Second Department, affirmed. 161 The Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that the inherent power of the courts
does not extend to the power to direct the state or a county to
pay assigned counsel. 162 Such a power may only be exercised in
the presence of a legislative provision for payment. 63 Since
that provision was not made for assigned counsel in this type of
proceeding, as it was for service as commissioner and service as
a medical witness, the court could not order the city to pay Mor-
rison's fees.164
155. 297 N.Y. 190, 78 N.E.2d 467 (1948).
156. Id. at 193, 78 N.E.2d at 468.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 193-94, 78 N.E.2d at 469 (citing Mental Hygiene Law § 85(6), Act
of March 30, 1927, ch. 426, 1927 N.Y. Laws 981, as amended by Act of March 31,
1932, ch. 574, § 1, 1932 N.Y. Laws 1223, 1223-24, Act of April 24, 1933, ch. 395,
§ 24, 1933 N.Y. Laws 926, 935, Act of April 29, 1935, ch. 561, 1935 N.Y. Laws 1172,
Act of April 7, 1944, ch. 666, § 40, 1944 N.Y. Laws 1407, 1434-35, repealed by Act of
July 1, 1972, ch. 251, 1972 N.Y. Laws 468).
159. Id. at 193, 78 N.E.2d at 468.
160. In re Sullivan, 187 Misc. 687, 689, 64 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1946).
161. In re Sullivan, 272 A.D. 780, 70 N.Y.S.2d 572 (2d Dep't 1947).
162. Sullivan, 297 N.Y. at 196, 78 N.E.2d at 470.
163. Id. at 195-96, 78 N.E.2d at 470.
164. Id. at 196, 78 N.E.2d at 470.
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e. In re Eaton 165
The treasurer of a state mental hospital sued Onondaga
County, its board of supervisors, and its treasurer and auditor,
seeking an order compelling them to audit and pay bills for
housing patients committed by judges sitting in the county.166
The court held that even if there were no law requiring counties
to pay for the maintenance of the criminally insane within the
county,16 7 "still a magistrate has the power to, by order, obtain
information for the proper determination of his judicial func-
tions and direct the county in which he serves to pay the ex-
pense thereof." 68 That power included the power to commit the
potentially insane for short periods of time for observation in
order to determine their proper disposition. 69
From these expenditure cases 170 a two-step analytical
framework emerges for inherent judicial budgetary power cases
in New York. A court ordering expenditure of funds must first
determine if the legislature has enacted limits on the type of
expenditure in question.17' If limits have been enacted, the ap-
plicant is limited to the statutorily approved expenditures, and
the court cannot invoke its inherent power to order additional
165. 196 Misc. 648, 92 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1949), affd
mem., 279 A.D. 1038, 113 N.Y.S.2d 279, motion for leave to appeal denied, 280 A.D.
881, 114 N.Y.S.2d 264 (4th Dep't 1952).
166. Id. at 650, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65. Eaton, the named party, was the
treasurer of the Syracuse Psychopathic Hospital, operated by the State Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene. Id. at 648, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 461. During the period of May
1942 to July 1949, various judges within the city of Syracuse had signed orders
committing several hundred persons to the hospital for a specified period of obser-
vation. Id. The hospital honored the orders and provided care commensurate with
the ordered observation. Id. The bills for these services were approved by the
judges signing the commitment orders and were presented for payment, which was
refused. Id.
167. Note that in this case there was such a law. Id. at 652-54, 92 N.Y.S.2d at
465-68 (citing Mental Hygiene Law § 79, Act of March 30, 1927, ch. 426, 1927 N.Y.
Laws 981, as amended by Act of March 11, 1931, ch. 71, § 2, 1931 N.Y. Laws 392,
393, Act of April 24, 1933, ch. 395, § 17, 1933 N.Y. Laws 926, 934, Act of April 7,
1944, ch. 666, § 36, 1944 N.Y. Laws 1407, 1431-32, Act of April 14, 1946, ch. 769,
1946 N.Y. Laws 1504, repealed by Act of July 1, 1972, ch. 251, 1972 N.Y. Laws
468).
168. Id. at 654, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
169. Id. at 654-55, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
170. See supra notes 43-67 and accompanying text for distinction between ex-
penditure and appropriations cases.
171. See supra notes 130-32, 135-39, 162-64 and accompanying text.
182
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/4
1994] WACHTLER v. CUOMO
expenditures. 172 This applies if the limitation states a formula
for determining the amount of an expenditure, such as in Moy-
nahan173 and the Cole cases, 174 or if it is exclusive, such as in
Sullivan.175 If the contemplated expenditure is not limited
under this part of the test, the court may order the expenditure
if it is necessary and proper for the court's functions.176
2. Constitutional Amendment
Before 1961, the state constitution's judiciary article con-
tained no express provision on court funding. 177 Article VI, sec-
tion 29(c), added in 1961, provided that:
Insofar as the expense of the courts is borne by the state or paid
by the state in the first instance, the final determination of the
itemized estimates of the annual financial needs of the courts
shall be made by the legislature and the governor in accordance
with articles four [executive branch] and seven 178 [state finances]
of this constitution. 179
A new judiciary article, containing section 29(c), was passed by
concurrent resolution by the Senate and Assembly in the 1959
172. See supra notes 130-32, 135-39, 162-64 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
176. Compare In re Kenney, 153 A.D. 325, 137 N.Y.S. 1097 (2d Dep't 1912)
with In re Eaton, 196 Misc. 648, 92 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1949), affd mem., 279
A.D. 1038, 113 N.Y.S.2d 279, motion for leave to appeal denied, 280 A.D. 881, 114
N.Y.S.2d 264 (4th Dep't 1952).
177. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE.OF NEW YORK, 1956-1957,
which reprints N.Y. CONST. art. VI, amended by N.Y. CONST. art. VI, as in force on
January 1,. 1956. The only provisions related to judicial finances related to the
liability of local authorities for the compensation of county judges and judges of the
City Court of the City of New York. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 11, 15, amended by
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, reprinted in THE CoNsTrrurioN OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
1956-1957.
178. "Itemized estimates of the financial needs of... the judiciary,... shall be
transmitted to the governor... for inclusion in the budget without revision but
with such recommendations as he may deem proper." N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
179. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 29(c).
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session. 80 The amendment, including the new section 29(c), be-
came effective September 1, 1962.181
The legislative history of the new article VI is ambiguous.
What records exist of the proposed article by the Assembly and
Senate deal generally with their actions, not their debates. 182 A
temporary group of nonlegislators, however, was formed to
study judicial reform and advise the legislature on reorganizing
the state judiciary. 8 3 This group implicitly rejected any judicial
role in the decisionmaking process of judicial appropriations.18
On the other hand, the attorney general's required opinion8 5
does not mention court funding or the mandate power of the
New York City courts. 8 6 The opinion states that, other than
the effects on other areas mentioned, the new article would
have no effect on the constitution. 8 7
180. See 1959 N.Y. Laws Ixi-Ixxv (McKinney). Several technical amendments
to the new article were made, necessitating that the process start over in 1960.
See Nelson Rockefeller, Governor's Annual Message, in 1960 N.Y. Laws 1955, 1965
(McKinney) (noting desired amendments); 1960 N.Y. Laws lxxxv (McKinney) (de-
tailing changes); see also N.Y. CoNsT. art. XIX, § 1 (amendment procedure requires
passage of identical concurrent resolutions in successive years). Concurrent reso-
lutions regarding the new article were passed by the Senate and Assembly in 1960,
Concurrent Resolution of March 23, 1960, 1960 N.Y. Laws 2693-2718, and 1961,
Concurrent Resolution of January 16, 1961, 1961 N.Y. Laws 2708-34, and the arti-
cle was approved by the voters in the general election held November 7, 1961.
1962 N.Y. Laws 4025.
181. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 37.
182. See, e.g., 1961 N.Y. ASEM. JOURNAL 180-81, 239-66, 1960 N.Y. ASSEM.
JOURNAL 3206, 3313, 3401-3426, 1959 N.Y. ASSEM. JOURNAL 2842, 3041, 3095-
3120.
183. TEMPORARY COMM'N ON THE COURTS, PART I, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
REORGANIZATION OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK
AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION, Leg. Doc. 1958 No. 36, at 23-24.
184. Id. The Commission document rejects mandate power of certain New
York City courts and states that judicial needs need to be balanced against the
needs of the community at large and that balancing should be done by appropriat-
ing bodies, not the courts. Id.
185. The attorney general is required to report to the Senate and Assembly on
the potential constitutional effect of proposed amendments to the constitution.
N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1.
186. 1961 N.Y. ASSEM. JoUNAL 226-27.
187. Id.
184
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3. Imposition of Implicit Restrictions on Article VI,
Section 29(c)
McCoy v. Mayor,188 the first case to deal with the problem of
inherent judicial budgetary power after the enactment of article
VI, section 29(c), arose after the City of New York refused to
fund a new court created by the legislature.189 The State Ad-
ministrator and the administrative judge of the civil court
brought an Article 78 proceeding' 90 to overturn the city's deter-
mination and compel funding of the new court. 191 The city and
its officials defended on the basis of an alleged lack of standing
on the part of the judges and that any budgetary modifications
were within the sole discretion of the city and its officials. 192
188. 73 Misc. 2d 508, 342 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), mod. on other
grounds, 41 A.D.2d 929, 344 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1st Dep't 1973).
189. Id. at 509-10, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (citing Act of June 8, 1972, ch. 982, 1972
N.Y. Laws 3852). The state legislature created a housing part for the Civil Court
of the City of New York and transferred jurisdiction of violations of various hous-
ing laws to that part from the Criminal Court of the City of New York. Id. The
Civil Court then sought funding from city officials for the new Housing Part, but
city officials refused to appropriate any monies for it. Id. at 510, 342 N.Y.S.2d at
85. "Insofar as the expense of the courts is not paid by the state... and is borne by
... the City of New York... the final determination.., of the annual financial
needs of the courts shall be made by the appropriate governing bodies of ... the
city of New York .... " N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 29(d).
190. An Article 78 proceeding is an action to obtain the "[rielief previously
obtained by writs of certiorari to review, mandamus or prohibition." N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. 7801 (McKinney 1981). The remedies of certiorari to review, manda-
mus and prohibition were combined into a single proceeding in the Civil Practice
Act, 23A CARMODY-WArr 2D 145:1 (citing Act of May 22, 1937, ch. 526, 1937 N.Y.
Laws 1186), and that procedure was retained when the CPLR replaced the Civil
Practice Act. Act of April 4, 1962, ch. 308, 1962 N.Y. Laws 1297. The purpose of
the consolidation was to eliminate the technical distinctions between the remedies
which served primarily to hamper the ability of the courts to grant relief to parties
who had demonstrated a right to relief but who chosen the wrong method of pursu-
ing it. 23A CARMODY-WArr 2D 145:2 (citing Toscano v. McGoldrick, 300 N.Y. 156,
83 N.E.2d 873 (1949)); see also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 7801 commentary at 25-26
(McKinney 1981) (reform to eliminate technical procedural distinctions); id. at 26-
29 (difficulty in establishing standards for determining which writ to pursue). No
change in the substantive law was made, therefore to prevail in an Article 78 ac-
tion, the plaintiff must show that certiorari, mandamus or prohibition could have
been obtained at common law. Id. at 26 (citing Sanford v. Rockefeller, 35 N.Y.2d
547, 324 N.E.2d 113, 364 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. Sanford
v. Carey, 421 U.S. 973 (1975)).
191. McCoy, 73 Misc. 2d at 509, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
192. Id., 342 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85.
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The supreme court's analysis started at the inherent power
doctrine's conventional starting point: "The Judiciary has the
right and power to protect itself from the impairment of its
functions and it has the co-ordinate authority to make full use
of its jurisdiction."193 The state administrator and the adminis-
trative judge, therefore, acting for the State Judicial Conference
and the civil court, respectively, had standing to seek relief that
would give effect to the new grant of jurisdiction. 94 The court
acknowledged that article VI, section 29 eliminated the judici-
ary's inherent power to control its budgeting and transferred
the power of appropriation to the political branches for determi-
nation.195 This power, however, was limited to review of budget
estimates and could not be read to release the city "of its obliga-
tion to furnish the necessary funds as required by the Courts for
their functioning in the proper discharge of the constitutional
requirement to operate an efficient system of justice." 96
Thus, despite the apparently clear mandate of article VI,
section 29, the city had no authority "to cut-off all funds for the
Courts within the City of New York" 97 and that the "limits of
respondents' [the city and its officials] discretion are constitu-
tionally proscribed." 98 The court then ordered the city to begin
funding of the court in question. 99
The deterioration of New York City's financial condition re-
sulted in the two most recent cases on inherent judicial budget-
ary power, Ascione v. City of New York 200 and Blyn v. Bartlett.20 1
The underlying dispute was the firing of law clerks and law sec-
193. Id. at 510, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (citations omitted).
194. Id., 342 N.Y.S.2d at 85-86.
195. Id. at 511, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
196. Id. at 510-11, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
197. Id. at 511, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 86, 87 (citing Commonwealth ex. rel. Carroll,
274 A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. 1971)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 509-10, 513, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 85, 88. The appellate division's only
modification was to change the effective date of the supreme court's order, to re-
flect a change in the law creating the housing part. McCoy v. Mayor, 41 A.D.2d
929, 344 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1st Dep't 1973).
200. 84 Misc. 2d 414, 379 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), modified
on other grounds sub nom. Blyn v. Bartlett, 50 A.D.2d 442, 379 N.Y.S.2d 616 (3d
Dep't), affd as modified, 39 N.Y.2d 349, 348 N.E.2d 555, 384 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1976).
201. 84 Misc. 2d 394, 379 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), rev'd, 50
A.D.2d 442, 379 N.Y.S.2d 616 (3d Dep't), afld, 39 N.Y.2d 349, 348 N.E.2d 555, 384
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1976).
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retaries of various judges in New York City as a cost-saving
measure.
20 2
As in McCoy, the court in Ascione started with the general
principles expressed in Carroll: 1) that our government divides
responsibilities among the three branches, which are separate
and coequal; 2) that the branches may not encroach on each
other's jurisdiction, nor prevent another branch from perform-
ing its duties; and 3) that each branch has the inherent power
to protect itself from impairment.203
The court then cited McCoy for the proposition that while
the courts no longer had mandatory budget powers, an "appro-
priating body" was limited in its discretion to review the budget
request of the courts.2°4 The court then examined the Judiciary
Law and concluded that "final determination" language present
in article VI, section 29 only applied to the sums appropriated
for a specific court and not to specific items present in the esti-
mates prepared by the courts.20 5 To hold otherwise would allow
the "appropriating body" a voice in the administration of the
courts, which precedent specifically did not allow. 20 6 The court
then held that the Judiciary Law prohibited the state adminis-
202. Ascione, 84 Misc. 2d at 416, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 603-04. The Mayor of New
York told the state administrative judge to make further cuts in the courts' budget
for May 1975. Id. The administrative judge did so, preparing a budget that would
reduce court expenditures by $5.8 million. Id., 379 N.Y.S.2d at 603. To accomplish
this, the administrative judge eliminated personnel, including the personal attend-
ants to the justices of the supreme court in the First Judicial District, id., and the
law secretaries to the judges of the Civil Court of the City of New York. Blyn, 84
Misc. 2d at 395-96, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 582-83. The Administrative Board of the State
Judicial Conference then passed a resolution directing that the positions be elimi-
nated, and the Office of Court Administration gave notice to the persons in those
positions that they would be terminated. Ascione, 84 Misc. 2d at 416-17, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 603-04.
The personal attendants' association and the justices of the supreme court
each brought an Article 78 action to overturn the determinations of the state ad-
ministrative judge and the city. Id. at 415, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 602-03. The lawsuits
of the personal attendants association and the justices were consolidated. Id. In
Blyn, the law secretaries to the judges of the Civil Court of the City of New York
and the judges of the civil court each brought an Article 78 action to overturn the
determinations of the state administrative judge and the city. Blyn, 84 Misc. 2d at
395-96, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 582. The lawsuits of the law secretaries and the civil court
judges were also consolidated. Id.
203. Ascione, 84 Misc. 2d at 419, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 421, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
206. Id. at 420-22, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 607-08.
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trative judge or the city from dismissing the personal assistants
of city court judges and ordered them reinstated.207
The court in Blyn relied primarily on Judiciary Law section
222208 to hold that the administrative board's resolution elimi-
nating the positions was void.209 In dealing with the constitu-
tional question, the court held that the budget powers contained
in article VI, section 29 were at most, coordinate with the power
of the judiciary. 210 To hold otherwise would allow "the Legisla-
tive and Executive branches of government [to] invade and en-
croach unlawfully upon the functions and authority duly
delegated by our constitution and state laws to the judicial
branch of government."21' The appeals in Blyn and Ascione
were consolidated and transferred to the Third Department.21 2
In each of the consolidated suits, the constitutional issues re-
garding inherent judicial budgetary power that were raised and
decided in the supreme court were ignored by the appellate
courts.
The appellate division reversed the judgment in Blyn and
modified the judgment in Ascione,213 holding that the language
in Judiciary Law section 222 clearly made the appointment of
assistants to judges subject to the budget powers of appropriat-
ing bodies.214 This allowed the administrative board and the
city to eliminate the positions by acting in concert - the admin-
istrative board submitting a budget that eliminated the posi-
tions, and the city approving that budget.215 The Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that the extreme financial emergency
207. Id. at 424-427, 430, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 610-13, 616.
208. "Wherever... a judge or justice . . . is authorized to appoint personal
assistants to render to him legal or clerical services, the power of such judge or
justice... shall continue... subject to the final determination of budgets by appro-
priating bodies as provided in section twenty-nine of article six of the constitution."
Judiciary Law § 222, Act of Apr. 24, 1962, ch. 684, § 3, 1962 N.Y. Laws 3030, 3036,
as amended by Act of May 22, 1969, ch. 742, § 1, 1969 N.Y. Laws 1947, repealed by
Act of May 19, 1978, ch. 156, § 6, 1978 N.Y. Laws 323.
209. Blyn, 84 Misc. 2d at 414, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
210. Id. at 406, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
211. Id.
212. Blyn v. Bartlett, 50 A.D.2d 442, 444, 379 N.Y.S.2d 616, 619 (3d Dep't
1976).
213. Id. at 449-50, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
214. Id. at 447-48, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 621-22.
215. Id. at 449, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
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created a situation that required centralized action, action that
only could be taken by the Administrative Board.216
Judge Cooke's dissent 21 7 rested on three separate grounds.
First, the positions eliminated were created by legislative act
and could only be eliminated through legislative act.218 Second,
a common sense reading of section 29, that the budget power
could be wielded to control the compensation of persons in legis-
latively created positions, is the correct one.219 Third, the ma-
jority abandoned precedent that held that the city could not
create or abolish positions simply by adopting a budget.220
D. Justiciability of Controversies Involving Budgetary
Procedures
Whether the Governor, the legislature, or both have com-
plied with the procedures for the formulation, submission, and
passage of a state budget outlined in article VII of the state con-
stitution has been the subject for a number of decisions of the
Court of Appeals.22' How the court has dealt with these cases
has been a function of what it perceives the real controversy to
be in each case.
In People v. Tremaine,222 the Court of Appeals dealt with a
direct legislative challenge to the Governor's power to direct the
budget process. In 1939, the Governor submitted to legislature
a budget and four appropriations bills that itemized the
amounts for various types of expenses for each of the depart-
ments of the government.223 When the legislature acted on the
216. Blyn v. Bartlett, 39 N.Y.2d 349, 358-59, 361-62, 348 N.E.2d 555, 559-60,
561-62, 384 N.Y.S.2d 99, 104, 106 (1976).
217. Id. at 362-64, 348 N.E.2d at 562-63, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 106-07 (Cooke, J.,
dissenting). Judge Fuchsberg concurred in Judge Cooke's dissent. Id.
218. Id. at 362, 348 N.E.2d at 562, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 106 (citing Morrall v.
County of Monroe, 271 N.Y. 48, 51, 2 N.E.2d 40, 41 (1936) and Koch v. Mayor, 152
N.Y. 72, 75, 46 N.E. 170, 171 (1897)).
219. Id. at 363, 348 N.E.2d at 563, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 364, 348 N.E.2d at 563, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
221. See infra notes 221-60 and text accompanying.
222. 281 N.Y. 1, 21 N.E.2d 891 (1939).
223. Id. at 5-6, 21 N.E.2d at 893. The Governor's bill:
as required by section 36 of the State Finance Law (Consol. Laws, ch. 56),
the appropriations for the department, division or bureau were divided into
two main items, namely, expenses for personal service and expenses for
maintenance and operation. The appropriations for personal service were
by an accompanying schedule itemized so that amounts should be available
19941
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Governor's bill for governmental operations, it struck out all of
the itemization, and combined all the requests into a single
lump sum appropriation for each department. 224 The Governor
signed the budget bill solely so it could be challenged in the
courts. 225 While the court specifically stayed away from the
question of what level of itemization was necessary in the
budget, 226 the court held that the legislature had violated the
provisions of the state constitution by striking out the Gover-
nor's itemization and replacing it with lump sum
appropriations. 227
In a recent case, the Court of Appeals returned to the same
issue. In New York State Bankers Association, Inc. v. Wetzler,228
a challenge to an amendment to the state operations budget bill
was upheld. In amending the state operations budget bill, the
legislature tacked on a provision authorizing the commissioner
of taxation to assess fees against certain banking corporations
for the cost of conducting tax audits of those corporations. 229
The Governor signed the bill, including the "audit fee" provi-
sion, into law.230 When the commissioner started acting pursu-
ant to his authority, the Cayuga Lake National Bank and the
Association sued.23' The supreme court and the appellate divi-
for each of the various positions or groups of positions in the department,
division or bureau. These items are commonly referred to as 'line items.'
Likewise in each instance of an appropriation for maintenance and opera-
tion, there is an itemized statement accompanying the schedule showing the
amounts which were to be available for the various expenses.
Id. at 6, 21 N.E.2d at 893.
224. Id. at 6-7, 21 N.E.2d at 893.
225. People v. Tremaine, 257 A.D. 117, 120, 13 N.Y.S.2d 125, 128 (3d Dep't
1939).
226. Tremaine, 281 N.Y. at 11-12, 21 N.E.2d at 896:
In between the two extremes [between complete itemization and the use of
lump sum appropriations] we must rely upon the Executive and Legislative
Branch of the government to provide a budget sufficiently itemized to com-
ply with the spirit and words of the Constitution, and yet containing lump
sum appropriations when experience in the line of work or in the depart-
ment shows that details and items in a budget would be impracticable or
almost impossible unworkable.
Id.
227. Id. at 8, 10-11, 21 N.E.2d at 894, 895.
228. 81 N.Y.2d 98, 612 N.E.2d 294, 595 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1993).
229. Id. at 101, 612 N.E.2d at 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
230. Id.; see Act of June 6, 1990, ch. 50, 1990 N.Y. Laws 144 (Lawyers Coop.).
231. Wetzler, 81 N.Y.2d at 101, 612 N.E.2d at 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
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sion both found that the enactment of the audit fee provision
violated section 4 of article VII of the state constitution, and
enjoined enforcement of the law.23 2
The Court of Appeals held that the controversy was justici-
able.233 The court rejected the state's argument that the matter
was not justiciable because the budgetary process was the ex-
clusive domain of the executive and legislative branches, for
which the state cited the court's prior holding in Saxton v. Ca-
rey.234 First, the court noted that Saxton had not said that the
budgetary process was totally immune from judicial review, and
had expressly reserved to the judicial branch review of "dis-
putes concerning the scope of that authority which is granted by
the Constitution to the other two branches of the government,"
including budgetary disputes.235 Second, the controversy, in the
court's view, was not regarding what was enacted, but whether
the legislature had any authority to enact the law at all, which
was justiciable. 236
On the merits, the court found that the audit fee provision
violated article VII, section four.237 That section created an un-
ambiguous, limited grant of authority to the legislature to alter
budget bills in certain ways. Those ways were limited to strik-
ing out items, reducing items, or adding items of appropria-
tion.23 8 The "audit fee" provision was adopted by the legislature
in direct violation of this command. As to the court stated: "To
approve it [the "audit fee" provision] would be to disparage the
very foundation of the People's protection against abuse of
power by the State - the tripartite form of government estab-
lished in the Constitution."239 The court then affirmed the order
of the appellate division.
232. Id. (citing 151 Misc. 2d 684, 573 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga County
1991), affd, 184 A.D.2d 1077, 586 N.Y.S.2d 779 (4th Dep't 1992)).
233. Id. at 102-03, 612 N.E.2d at 295-96, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 937-38.
234. 44 N.Y.2d 545, 378 N.E.2d 95, 406 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1978); see infra notes
249-60 and text accompanying.
235. Wetzler, 81 N.Y.2d at 102, 612 N.E.2d at 296, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 938 (quot-
ing Saxton, 44 N.Y.2d at 551, 378 N.E.2d at 99, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 735).
236. Id. (citing Korn v. Gulotta, 72 N.Y.2d 363, 369-70, 530 N.E.2d 816, 818-
19, 534 N.Y.S.2d 108, 110-11 (1988); Saxton, 44 N.Y.2d at 548-51, 378 N.E.2d at
97-99, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 734-35).
237. Id. at 103-05, 612 N.E.2d at 296-97, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 939-40.
238. Id. at 104, 612 N.E.2d at 297, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
239. Id. at 105, 612 N.E.2d at 297, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
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However, when the challenge is not based on a direct viola-
tion of the budgetary procedures, in the words of Wetzler, "con-
cern[ing] not what was enacted or its effect on the budgetary
process, but whether there was authority to enact the provision
at all,"240 but rather a challenge directed at the substance of the
appropriations bills, the Court of Appeals have consistently
held that those challenges are not justiciable. In Hidley v.
Rockefeller,2 1 state employees challenged the constitutionality
of the appropriations bills for the 1971-72 fiscal year.242 The ba-
sis of the challenge was that the bills approved by the legisla-
ture were not sufficiently itemized pursuant to article VII of the
state constitution. 243 The supreme court had held that the ap-
propriations bills were unconstitutional,2 44 but the appellate di-
vision reversed and held that bills were valid.245
The Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division, and
ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
bills.246 The court stated: "Plaintiffs' real quarrel is with the
amount of the appropriations, not with the form or method
whereby they were requested and enacted.... Neither is there
any showing that any positions would be more secure had the
budgetary and legislative processes taken the form that plain-
tiffs assert are constitutionally mandated."247 The court conse-
quently dismissed the complaint.248
The Court of Appeals confronted this issue in more depth
seven years later in Saxton v. Carey.249 In Saxton, the plaintiffs
challenged the entire 1978-79 budget on the basis that the Gov-
ernor failed to submit a proper budget.250 The perceived flaw in
the budget was again the level of itemization, or rather the lack
240. Id. at 102, 612 N.E.2d at 296, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
241. 28 N.Y.2d 439, 271 N.E.2d 530, 322 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1971).
242. Id. at 441, 271 N.E.2d at 532, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 688-89 (Breitel, J.,
dissenting).
243. Id., 271 N.E.2d at 532, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
244. Hidley v. Rockefeller, 65 Misc. 2d 954, 320 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1971).
245. Hidley v. Rockefeller, 36 A.D.2d 387, 320 N.Y.S.2d 957 (3d Dep't 1971).
246. Hidley, 28 N.Y.2d at 440, 271 N.E.2d at 531, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 44 N.Y.2d 545, 378 N.E.2d 95, 406 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1978).
250. Id. at 548, 378 N.E.2d at 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
192 [Vol. 14:153
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/4
1994] WACHTLER v. CUOMO
thereof.251 The supreme court dismissed the action,252 but the
appellate division reinstated the complaint,253 and held that the
budget was valid.25 4 Unlike Hidley, on this occasion the Court
of Appeals addressed the merits.255
On the merits, the court rejected the notion that it had a
proper role in supervising the level of itemization in the budget
submitted by the Governor.256 The court stated that each of the
branches of government had particular functions to pursue, and
that while pursuing them, "each department should be free
from interference,... by either of the others."257 The court then
examined the constitutional scheme of budgeting, and found
that the "creation and enactment of the State budget is a matter
delegated essentially to the Governor and the legislature."258
Itemization, the court held, was necessary for the legislature to
properly conduct its role in the budget process, to approve or
reject the Governor's proposed expenditures. However, itemiza-
tion is an elastic term, not easily defined.259 These two facts led
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Saxton v. Carey, 61 A.D.2d 645, 403 N.Y.S.2d 779 (3d Dep't 1978).
254. Saxton, 44 N.Y.2d at 548, 378 N.E.2d at 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
255. The standing requirement that was fatal to the complaint in Hidley was
no longer an issue by the time of Saxton because of the Court of Appeals's decision
in Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 334 N.E.2d 579, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623
(1975). Saxton, 44 N.Y.2d at 548, 378 N.E.2d at 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 733-34.
256. Saxton, 44 N.Y.2d at 548-49, 378 N.E.2d at 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
257. Id. at 549, 378 N.E.2d at 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 734 (quoting People ex rel.
Burby v. Howland, 155 N.Y. 270, 282, 49 N.E. 775, 779 (1898)).
258. Id., 378 N.E.2d at 97-98, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
259. Id. at 549-50, 378 N.E.2d at 98, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 734-35. To illustrate
this point, the court quoted Judge Breitel's dissent in Hidley:
There is a constitutional mandate to itemize. There is no constitutional def-
inition of itemization. There is no judicial definition of itemization and no
inflexible definition is possible. Itemization is an accordion word. An item
is little more than a 'thing' in a list of things. A house is an item, and so is a
chair in the house, or the nail in the chair, depending on the depth and
purpose of the classification. The specificness or generality of itemization
depends upon its function and the context in which it is used. In one context
of a budget or appropriation bill the description of 1,000 police officers
within a flexible salary range would be specific and particular; in another it
would leave the appointing power with almost unlimited control. In one
context an 'item' of $5,000,000 for construction of a particular expressway
might seem specific; in another, void of indication when, how, or where the
expressway or segments of it would be constructed. This suggests that there
is something of a battle over words in debating the need for items, rather
than a grappling with a functional concept.
41
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:153
the court to a single conclusion, that whether the Governor's
submission to the legislature was properly itemized was a mat-
ter for legislative, not judicial, determination.260
E. Wachtler v. Cuomo
1. Facts
Faced with a six billion dollar budget deficit, 261 Governor
Cuomo submitted a budget for the fiscal year beginning April 1,
1991, that did not include the judiciary's request of $976 million
for the year. 262 Instead, the proposal contained the Governor's
request for $879 million, $97 million less than the judiciary's
request.263 The legislature restored some of the funds cut, even-
Hidley, 28 N.Y.2d at 444, 271 N.E.2d at 533, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 691 (Breitel, J.,
dissenting).
260. Saxton, 44 N.Y.2d at 550-51, 378 N.E.2d at 948, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
The court stated:
the degree of itemization necessary in a particular budget is whatever de-
gree of itemization is necessary for the Legislature to effectively review that
budget. This is a decision which is best left to the Legislature, for it is not
something which can be accurately delineated by a court.... Should the
Legislature determine that a particular budget is so lacking in specificity as
to preclude meaningful review, then it will be the duty of that Legislature to
refuse to approve such a budget. If, however, as here, the Legislature is
satisfied with the budget as submitted by the Governor, then it is not for the
courts to intervene and declare such a budget invalid because of a failure to
measure up to some mythical budget specifically delineating the exact fate
of every penny of the public funds.... Should a Legislature fail in its re-
sponsibility to require a sufficiently itemized budget, the remedy lies not in
the courtroom, but in the voting booth.
Id.
261. Gary Spencer, Battle is Joined Over State Judiciary Budget, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 1, 1991, at 1. Governor Cuomo's financial plan for the 1991-92 fiscal year
anticipated a $6 billion deficit in a $51.9 billion budget. Id.
262. Id.
263. Gary Spencer, Budget Seeks 15 Judges, No Pay Hike, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 3,
1990, at 1. The judiciary submitted a $976 million request for the 1991-92 fiscal
year. Id. The Governor then demanded a $90 million reduction in the request, to
which the judiciary refused. Spencer, supra note 261, at 1. The Governor actually
submitted the request without revision as required by the state Constitution. See
N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 1. The Governor reduced the request by 10% in his finan-
cial plan submitted to the legislature. Gary Spencer, Wachtler, Cuomo Spar Over
Budget, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 11, 1991, at 1.
In doing so, the Governor clearly violated the spirit, if not the letter of article
VII. Section 2 of article VII requires the Governor to submit a budget that "con-
tain[s] a complete plan of expenditures proposed to be made before the close of the
ensuing fiscal year." N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 2. The Governor's budget bills must
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tually passing a budget that allocated some $899 million for the
judiciary.264 The new budget forced the judiciary into a series of
cost-cutting moves, including the wide scale closure of civil trial
parts in New York City and dismissal of court personnel. 265 Af-
ter several months of bitter arguments between the Governor
and the Chief Judge, the Chief Judge sued the Governor in Sep-
tember 1991 in Albany County Supreme Court.266
2. Procedural History
The suit sought an injunction barring the Governor from
altering the judiciary's budget request prior to submitting it to
the legislature for action as well as an order requiring the legis-
lature to fund the judiciary at the level it requested from the
Governor. 267 The cause of action for additional funds relied on
no specific state constitutional or statutory provisions, but in-
stead on the "constitutional and inherent right [of the judicial
necessarily reflect the content of the budget that the Governor has submitted.
N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 3. Because the power of the legislature to alter the budget
bills is limited, N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4, the Governor's budget and financial plan
become the base line from which all debate and negotiation on the budget occurs.
George F. Carpinello, Is Governor Cuomo's Budget Unconstitutional?, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 22, 1991, at 1. By doing so, the Governor, for all intents and purposes, revised
the Judiciary's budget request before submitting it to the legislature, by interpos-
ing his revisions in the financial plan and budget bills.
But the constitutional convention that proposed article VII moved to limit the
Governor's power to revise the estimated needs of the judiciary. Id. (quoting COM-
MrrrEE ON STATE FiNs., N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVmrENoN OF 1915, REPORT,
in 2 REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1915, at 1153). The
convention's intent was to require the Governor to transmit the judiciary's request
as part of the Governor's budget, without revision, along with any recommenda-
tions regarding the request that the Governor might see fit to make. Id. There-
fore, the Governor's failure to include the judiciary's request in his budget was a
violation of his duty under article VII.
264. Gary Spencer, Legislature Appropriates $899 Million for Judiciary, N.Y.
L.J., June 4, 1991, at 1.
265. Spencer, supra note 9, at 1. The failure of the unions representing court
employees to agree to an extension of the lag payroll forced the Office of Court
Administration to lay off nearly 500 of those employees. Gary Spencer, Wachtler
v. Cuomo: See You in Court, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1991, at 1.
266. Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany County filed Sept. 27,
1991); see also Spencer, supra note 18, at 1. The suit also named Ralph Marino,
the Temporary President of the State Senate, Melvin Miller, the then Speaker of
the State Assembly, and the New York State Legislature as defendants. Plaintiff's
Verified Complaint at 1-2, Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County filed Sept. 27, 1991).
267. Verified Complaint at 29-31, Wachtler (No. 6034/91).
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branch], under the doctrine of separation of powers, to compel
defendants to fulfill their obligations and responsibilities to pro-
vide the minimum amount of money reasonable and necessary
for the judicial branch to fulfill its constitutional and statutory
functions."268
The Governor then filed both a civil rights action and a mis-
cellaneous proceeding to enjoin the state court action in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.269 The
district court denied the motion to enjoin Chief Judge Wach-
tler's state court action, and appointed former United States
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to mediate the dispute. 270 When
attempts at mediation failed,271 the Governor abandoned this
action for a new litigation strategy.272
This strategy brought the Governor to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of New York. First, on October
25, 1991, the Governor filed a petition to remove the state court
action to the federal court. 273 On October 31, the district court
ordered the parties to submit papers on the issue of jurisdiction
over the removed action.274 The Governor then refiled his civil
rights complaint in the Northern District.275 Later, the Gover-
nor then backed down and asked the court to dismiss his action
and remand Chief Judge Wachtler's action back to the Albany
268. Id. at 25-26.
269. Cuomo v. Wachtler, No. CV-91-3874 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 1991)
and Cuomo v. Wachtler, No. Misc. 91-469 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 1991); see
also Gary Spencer, Cuomo Sues to Block Wachtler Lawsuit, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 8, 1991,
at 1. A proceeding is designated miscellaneous when it requires the immediate
attention of the court. U.S. DisT. CT. E.D.N.Y. DIv. OF BusmNEss R. 50.1, 50.5.
270. Cuomo v. Wachtler, No. CV-91-3874 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 1991)
and Cuomo v. Wachtler, No. Misc. 91-469 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 1991) (one
order).
271. Gary Spencer, Court Dispute Mediation at an Impasse, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17,
1991, at 1.
272. Gary Spencer, New Cuts Sought From Court Budget, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 1,
1991; see also Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 91-CV-1235, slip op. at 2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov.
21, 1991).
273. Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 91-CV-1235 (N.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 25, 1991); see
also Spencer, supra note 272.
274. See Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 91-CV-1235, slip op. at 3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
1991).
275. Cuomo v. Wachtler, No. 91-CV-1270 (N.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 1, 1991).
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County Supreme Court.276 The district court considered the
merits of the removal petition and dismissed it, assessing costs
and attorney's fees against the Governor.277 The court then dis-
missed the Governor's civil rights action, declining to exercise
jurisdiction in favor of the state court.278
3. Settlement
The state court action proceeded to the point where the
judge hearing the case set a trial date for February 1992.279 The
Governor and the Chief Judge then settled the lawsuit in Janu-
ary. The Governor promised not to amend the judiciary's re-
quests and agreed to the judiciary's request for the current
fiscal year, and the Chief Judge agreed to an outside audit of
the judiciary's operations. 280
III. Analysis
The amendments to article VI of the state constitution
clearly limit the judiciary's inherent power to ensure adequate
funding.281 In this sense, courts can no longer incur expenses
and then compel other authorities to pay the bills. This ended
the expenditure cases, except in the limited situation of pay-
ment of emergency expenses from a fund set up for that pur-
pose, which even the court in Morgan County conceded. 28 2
In the appropriation cases in New York, such as Wachtler v.
Cuomo, the question remains, is there an inherent power of the
judiciary to act in this area? Historically, the courts in New
York have been reluctant to give the power any effect, and have
always made that power subject to legislative enactment.283
Giving this rule a literal application, this would preclude any
challenge to the budget passed by the legislature, since that
276. Affidavit of Kenneth R. Feinberg, Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 91-CV-1235
(N.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 14, 1991); see also Gary Spencer, Cuomo Drops Effort to Shift
Funding Suit, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 15, 1991 at 1.
277. Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 91-CV-1235 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1991).
278. Cuomo v. Wachtler, No. 91-CV-1270 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1991).
279. Today's News: Update, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 19, 1991, at 1.
280. Spencer, supra note 13, at 1.
281. See supra notes 177-220 and accompanying text.
282. Morgan County Comm'n v. Powell, 293 So. 2d 830, 835 (Ala. 1974); see
supra text accompanying note 101.
283. See supra notes 122-76 and accompanying text.
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budget is a legislative enactment, which would preclude the ex-
ercise of an inherent power. In this respect, the early New York
cases reach the same result as the Alabama Supreme Court did
in Morgan County, although the methodology in reaching the
result is somewhat different. 284
In both the early New York cases and in Morgan County,
the analysis fails to take into account the judiciary's role as a
check on the legislature, which is part of the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers.285 As Carroll286 and Wayne County,287 and the
trial court opinions in McCoy,25 Blyn,289 and to a lesser extent,
Ascione,290 show, the absolute separation of powers envisioned
by the Morgan County majority is a mere fiction. The judici-
ary's lack of total immunity from the political process has, as an
almost inescapable corollary, demonstrated that the legislative
branch is not totally immune from judicial control of its func-
tions, including appropriations. 291
Whatever the failings of the analysis of Morgan County or
the early New York cases, today section 29(c) of article VI of the
state constitution has eliminated whatever vestiges of the in-
herent power remained in New York. This section of the consti-
tution squarely places the "final determination" of the
judiciary's needs in the hands of the legislature and the Gover-
nor.292 This limitation imposed on the judiciary is similar to the
limitation on the legislature's lawmaking power in article VII,
section 4, which was strictly enforced in Wetzler.293 Therefore,
284. Compare Morgan County's constitutional analysis, see supra notes 98-
106 and accompanying text with the inherently statutory analysis of the New York
cases, supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
286. Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 974 (1971); see supra notes 68-92 and accompanying text.
287. Judges for Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 190 N.W.2d 228
(Mich.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1971); see supra notes 53-64 and accompanying
text.
288. McCoy v. Mayor, 73 Misc. 2d 508, 342 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1973); see supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
289. Blyn v. Bartlett, 84 Misc. 2d 394, 379 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1975); see supra notes 202, 208-11 and accompanying text.
290. Ascione v. City of New York, 84 Misc. 2d 414, 379 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1975); see supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 177-87 and text accompanying.
293. See supra notes 228-39 and text accompanying.
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any use of a claimed inherent power is inconsistent with this
constitutional limitation, and must be struck down, as the audit
fee provision in Wetzler were struck down. 294
If there is an inherent power, to be kept consistent with the
case law in New York, it must be limited to cases in which the
appropriating body seeks to divest a court of its jurisdiction
through its funding decisions. This standard, while much more
limited than the holding in Carroll,295 harmonizes the holding
in McCoy 2 9 6 with the results in Blyn297 and Ascione.298
Likewise, the failure of the Governor to submit the judici-
ary's budget "without revision" as required by article VII, sec-
tion 1,299 will not entitle the judiciary to the funds eliminated by
the Governor prior to submission of the budget to the legisla-
ture. Such an action is closer to plaintiffs' attempts to invali-
date appropriations bills in Hidley30° and Saxton,301 rather than
those efforts in Tremaine30 2 and Wetzler.303 If the legislature is
dissatisfied with the level of itemization in a budget submitted
by the Governor, the legislature's recourse, as Saxton holds, is
to reject the budget and if the level of itemization is appropriate
in the legislature's view, the courts have no business reviewing
that judgment.3°4 Likewise, if the legislature is dissatisfied
with the Governor's proposed judiciary budget, the legislature
is empowered to reject it and if the legislature is satisfied with
the level of judicial funding proposed by the Governor and en-
acts the Governor's bill, the courts should not invalidate that
judgment. If a court were to invalidate an appropriations bill
on the basis of a violation of article VII, section 1, it would be
294. See supra notes 228-39 and text accompanying.
295. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 263.
300. Hidley v. Rockefeller, 28 N.Y.2d 439, 271 N.E.2d 530, 322 N.Y.S.2d 687
(1971); see supra notes 240-48 and accompanying text.
301. Saxton v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 545, 378 N.E.2d 95, 406 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1978);
see supra notes 249-60 and text accompanying.
302. People v. Tremaine, 281 N.Y. 1, 21 N.E.2d 891 (1939); see supra notes
222-27 and text accompanying.
303. New York State Bankers Ass'n, Inc. v. Wetzler, 81 N.Y.2d 98, 612 N.E.2d
294, 595 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1993); see supra notes 228-40 and text accompanying.
304. See supra notes 259-60 and text accompanying.
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actually reviewing what was enacted, rather than the process,
which precedent has prohibited.30 5
Applying these principles to Wachtler v. Cuomo, it appears
that the Chief Judge would not have prevailed on his claim for
additional operating funds. While the effect of the cut on the
judiciary was extreme, it did not divest the Unified Court Sys-
tem3 0 6 of any of its jurisdiction. The budgetary cuts did not
force any courts to close, but only caused a reallocation of trial
parts in the supreme court between civil terms and criminal
terms.307 This change that was not mandated, but reflected the
choice of the judiciary's administration. In the absence of a
state constitutional right to timely prosecution of civil claims,30 8
there was no deprivation of jurisdiction. Since the judiciary
could not show a deprivation of its constitutionally mandated
jurisdiction, it would not be entitled to the order for the addi-
tional funds that it sought.30 9
IV. Conclusion
The state of the judicial system in New York is of continu-
ing concern to the bench, the bar, and the public at large as
well. That system has been ravaged by chronic underfunding
and an exploding docket in the 1980's.310 The pressures created
by those forces left the Chief Judge with few options when the
305. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
306. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 1(a) provides:
There shall be a unified court system for the state. The state-wide courts
shall consist of the court of appeals, the supreme court including the appel-
late divisions thereof, the court of claims, the county court, the surrogate's
court and the family court, as hereinafter provided. The legislature shall
establish in and for the city of New York, as part of the unified court system
for the state, a single, city-wide court of civil jurisdiction and a single, city-
wide court of criminal jurisdiction, as hereinafter provided, and may upon
the request of the mayor and the local legislative body of the city of New
York, merge the two courts into one city-wide court of both civil and criminal
jurisdiction. The unified court system for the state shall also include the
district, town, city and village courts outside the city of New York, as herein-
after provided.
Id. (emphasis added).
307. See supra note 9.
308. See supra note 34.
309. See supra notes 295-98 and text accompanying.
310. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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Governor refused to submit the Unified Court System's budget
request for 1991-92 to the legislature "without revision."
In response to the Governor's actions, the Chief Judge
chose the avenue designed to generate the most publicity for his
cause, suing the other two branches of state government, seek-
ing the courts to act pursuant to their inherent powers. Other
judges and courts have been successful in obtaining necessary
funds for judicial operations,3 11 and the expression of such an
inherent power is not necessarily incompatible with the concept
of separation of powers.312 But the history of attempts to use
the doctrine in New York,313 the manner in which the courts of
record are funded in this state, and the Court of Appeals' reluc-
tance to disturb the acts of the Governor and the legislature in
the budget process 314 all lead to the conclusion that such a
power cannot be expressed by the New York courts.315 If there
is any remedy for underfunding of the judicial system, it is
solely in the ability of the advocates for the system, particularly
the bench and the bar, to convince the legislature to fund the
judicial system at an appropriate level.
Walter E. Swearingen*
311. See supra notes 17 and 66.
312. See supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 122-76, 188-220 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 221-60 and accompanying text.
315. See supra 281-309 and accompanying text.
* The author would like to thank his family and friends for their support dur-
ing his law school years, and the editors and members of Pace Law Review whose
hard work and attention made publication of this article possible. This article is
dedicated in memory of the author's grandmother, Doris Swearingen.
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